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This thesis examines the 1917 to 1920 Ukrainian Revolution, literary activity in 
post-Revolutionary Ukrainian, and the works of the eminent Ukrainian writer, Mykola 
Khvylovy in order to better understand how a short-lived Ukrainian cultural and literary 
renaissance took shape and how it was suppressed by the Communist Party. My paper is 
divided into three major parts, which address the Ukrainian Revolution, policies of the 
Soviet state regarding Ukrainian cultural and literary development, and the literary works 
of Mykola Khvylovy. 
In my first three chapters I undertake a fairly detailed analysis of the Ukrainian 
Revolution. Due to the complexity of the topic, I have divided it into three parts. In these 
three chapters, I explore the ways in which the Ukrainian intelligentsia sought to establish 
an autonomous Ukrainian state and how their attempts to create their own vision of an 
independent Ukraine were ultimately thwarted by foreign aggressions.  Despite the utter 
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chaos that characterized the Revolutionary era, the Ukrainian intelligentsia sought to 
establish a sovereign Ukrainian state. 
In chapter four, I examine the Soviet policy of Ukrainianization and its 
ideological antecedents in order to determine the ways in which it both contributed to and 
undermined attempts to foster Ukrainian political, literary, and cultural expansion. In the 
early years following the Ukrainian Revolution, first the Bolshevik party, and then the 
Soviet state recognized that it was imperative to gain support from the Ukrainian 
population. For a brief time a Ukrainian cultural and literary renaissance flourished, until 
the Soviet state ultimately proscribed all activity which did not occur under the aegis of 
the state. 
In the fifth chapter, I examine literary activity in Soviet Ukraine and the role of 
Mykola Khvylovy. By looking at the relationships among literary organizations and their 
connections to the Soviet State, I want to understand how Ukrainian literature was 
circumscribed by an increasingly repressive Soviet state. Lastly, I want to examine the 
literary life and works of Mykola Khvylovy in order to demonstrate his importance to this 
era, which has come to be known as “executed Ukrainian renaissance.” By analyzing 
Khvylovy’s polemical pamphlets and prose, I attempt to explain the author’s literary 
ideology and his vision for a new Ukrainian literature. In a close reading of Khvylovy’s 
Ia…Romantika, I consider aspects of the protagonist’s a psychological rupture, which 
reveals his self-doubt and uncertainty with the new revolutionary order.     
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The years 1917 to 1920 in Ukraine were an extremely complex and brutal period, during 
which time Ukraine sought to assert its right to exist as a sovereign nation. The Ukrainian 
Revolution was representative of a desire among the Ukrainian intelligentsia to establish 
an autonomous and independent state. Unlike the 1917 Russian Revolutions which had a 
social and political character, the Ukrainian Revolution was a battle fought primarily for 
national liberation. The Revolutionary forces in Ukraine were not Communist, but chiefly 
national.  Though the primary focus of my thesis is on literary activity and the Ukrainian 
writer Mykola Khvylovy, it would be difficult to approach the topic without viewing it 
within its historical context. As George Luckyj wrote, “(d)evelopments in Soviet Ukraine 
can be properly understood only when they are seen against the background of history.”  
The Ukrainian Revolution was the catalyst for an unprecedented amount of creative 
energy, underpinned by the idea that Ukraine, for the first time in its history, had an 
opportunity to assert its autonomy, both politically and culturally. The Revolution 
represented an attempt by the intelligentsia to define a Ukrainian national and cultural 
identity which was distinct from Russia. If we can regard “the age-long Russian-
Ukrainian relations…as a stream in which the Ukrainian and Russian currents 
intermingled and often vehemently opposed each other, then this period marks a strong 
upsurge of the Ukrainian tide, a flood stemmed only by force.”  This renaissance in 
Ukrainian political, cultural, and literary life was suppressed and then crushed by the 
presence of multiple foreign armies in Ukraine. Ultimately, the Red Army defeated the 
other occupying forces in Ukraine. The Bolsheviks crushed the political ambitions that 
many Ukrainians had for an independent Ukraine. In the absence of real political 
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autonomy, Ukrainian cultural and political identity often found expression through 
literature and literary activity.  
In the literary sphere, the Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy is widely 
recognized as the most outstanding representative of his era. His prose and polemical 
pamphlets challenged a traditional discourse on Ukrainian literature, which for centuries 
had characterized Ukrainian literature as “little Russian.” Khvylovy propounded a path 
for Ukrainian literature and cultural identity which called for a break from its historically-
subservient relationship to Russia. For his efforts Khvylovy was denounced by the Party 
and ultimately harassed into committing suicide. Although his name was deleted from the 
public record after his suicide, for many Ukrainians, Khvylovy became an icon, who 
symbolized self-sacrifice and an unwillingness to abandon his ideals in the face of an 
ever-more repressive Soviet regime. As George Grabowicz has written, Khvylovy was 
the one writer, “who like a lightning rod attracted, focused, and transmitted the enormous 
energies of his day—and the energies and powers of interpretation of succeeding 
generations.”  While Khvylovy’s polemical pamphlets demonstrate his literary ideology 
and vision for a new path for Ukrainian literature, a common theme in his prose concerns 
the profound sense of disillusionment that the author felt by what he recognized as a 
betrayal of Socialist ideals by the Soviet regime. His attempts to reconcile his strident 
beliefs in the aims of Communism with the brutal reality that Communism manifested 
produced in Khvylovy a psychological rupture, which is evident in his novella 
Ia…Romantika.      
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Under state surveillance even prior to 1930,  Khvylovy stood on the brink of a 
psychological breakdown. Correspondence from GPU informers attested to Khvylovy’s 
despondency and his suicidal ideation. In 1927 a GPU agent informed his handlers that 
Khvylovy was “ready to commit suicide in order to show what is really happening.”   The 
self-referential aspects of Khvylovy’s prose, notably in Ia…Romantika, underscore the 
author’s psychological crisis. In his final creative act, Khvylovy scripted his own suicide. 
As his invited guests gathered in an adjoining room, Khvylovy shot himself in the temple. 
His suicide note referenced the arrest of his close friend and fellow writer Mykhailo 
Yalovy: 
Arrest of Yalovy - this is the murder of an entire generation ... For what? Because 
we were the most sincere Communists? I don't understand. The responsibility for the 
actions of Yalovy's generation lies with me, Khvylovy. Today is a beautiful sunny day. I 
love life - you can't even imagine how much...   
 
What is striking about Khvylovy’s suicide and what makes it especially poignant 
is that it was, paradoxically, an act of selflessness. His suicide was not an admission of 
personal defeat; it was an act symbolic of defiance, which demonstrated Khvylovy’s 
willingness to die before surrendering his principles. Khvvylovy’s friends also 
understood the nature of his internal crisis.   
After Khvylovy’s death, his compatriot, the Vaplitian writer, Maik Iohansen, 
asserted that:  
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(Khvylovy’s) “I” split—and there was a horrible internal collision between the 
“communard” and the Ukrainian.  The Ukrainian revolted and…Khvylovy knew and 
understood that his act would literally have international significance. At his death 
Khvylovy was peaceful and happy. So, he knew how his act would be interpreted and 
what his shot signified.    
 
By examining in detail the years 1917 to 1920 in Ukraine and the literary activity 
that took shape after the revolution, I want to attempt to understand better the ways in 
which a Ukrainian political renaissance took shape, how it was affected by the presence 
of foreign armies on Ukrainian soil, and finally how these forces impacted Ukrainian 
autonomy. In the absence of political independence, ideas concerning Ukrainian cultural 
identity were preserved in the period of literary organization that followed the Ukrainian 
Revolution. During this brief period of relative freedom, Ukrainian writers sought to 
expand the discourse on Ukrainian literature and culture. Ultimately, however, many their 
ideas were deemed to be “deviationist,” and as Ukrainian autonomy was denied in the 
political sphere, so too were freedoms were curtailed in literary expression. Mykola 
Khvylovy was the one Ukrainian writer in the 1920s that most clearly embodied the idea 
of Ukrainian cultural and literary identity. His demise became symbolic of the Party’s 
attempts to liquidate any manifestation of independent Ukrainian thought. By providing 
the historical context for an examination of literary activity in Soviet Ukraine, we are 
able to appreciate better the forces that were at work to both promote and undermine 
Ukrainian national and cultural autonomy. In order to better understand the how 
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Ukrainian national identity came to be expressed in the literary activity of the 1920s, it is 
necessary to first examine political developments in Ukraine after the fall of the Russian 
Empire, which culminated in the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. 
Diametrically opposed to the Russian revolution in its aims, the Ukrainian revolution, 
which took place between 1917 and 1920, was a catalyst for creative expression in the 
both the literary and political realms. While the Revolutions in Russia took on a social 
and political character, in Ukraine the struggle was waged primarily as a war for national 
liberation and secondarily as a proletarian revolution.1 The Ukrainian Revolution 
presented the opportunity for the establishment of the long-held dream of Ukrainian 
statehood.  
The Revolution was an extremely complex period in Ukrainian history with 
multiple actors vying for control of the country. It did not occur over night, but rather 
over several years, during which time various foreign armies occupied various parts of 
Ukraine. I will focus primarily on three key forces and the interactions among them: the 
Ukrainian government in its various forms, the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, and the peasant 
population in Ukraine. My intention is to demonstrate and analyze several key points: 
that Ukrainians, in the form of the Central Rada, immediately sought to establish an 
autonomous Ukrainian state, but that they did so carefully, without the intent to 
destabilize or break away from Russia; that the Ukrainian and Bolshevik governments 
were incompatible for various reasons and that the Bolsheviks sought to destroy any 
independent Ukrainian state; that the peasants were a destructive force with no political 
                                                 
1Luckyj, George. Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine 1917-1934. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1990. 6. 
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or social ideology who played a major role in the fate of revolutionary governments. This 
relationship among the three was further affected by a rapidly changing and extremely 
complex environment, marked by competing Ukrainian governments, peasant uprisings, 
and foreign invasion.2 In the final assessment, I attempt to demonstrate that the 
relationship among the peasantry and with the Bolshevik and the Ukrainian government 
played a decisive role in both the establishment and destruction of the Ukrainian state.   
In order to describe more clearly the complicated chronology of the revolutionary 
period, I have used Dr. Paul Magosci’s method of dividing the revolution into three 
phases and analyzing each separately. The first phase, spanning from March 1917 until 
April of 1918 covers the time of the establishment of the Central Rada until its abolition 
by the Hetmanate; the second phase, April to December 1918, covers the time of the 
Hetmanate; and lastly, the third phase, January 1919 until October 20, 1920, when the 
Soviet government finally established itself throughout the country. 
 
Establishment of the Rada 
The Ukrainian revolutionary era began on March 13, 1917, after the Romanov 
dynasty fell and the Provisional government came to power in Russia. The Central Rada, 
a council representing various Ukrainian political parties and social organizations was 
headed by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The Rada became the nucleus of a nascent Ukrainian 
government which urged the Provisional government in Russia to approve the idea of 
Ukrainian autonomy. When the Rada convened on 19-21 April, 1917, with 900 delegates 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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from all parts of Dnieper Ukraine3, it immediately passed a resolution for the autonomy 
of Ukraine within Russia4 and proclaimed in its First Universal, on June 23, 1917, the 
right of the Ukrainian people to “manage its own life on its own soil.”5 The Rada stopped 
short of declaring full independence at this time, choosing to establish a Ukrainian state, 
“(w)ithout separating from all of Russia, without breaking with the Russian state.”6 The 
Rada’s pronouncement of Ukrainian autonomy was met with shock by Russians in Kiev 
and Petrograd. 7  According to the Russian press, the Rada’s proclamation was 
“criminal,”  “a stab in the back to Russia,” and a “strike to the revolution.” 8 
Nevertheless, the Russian Provisional government responded a month later by sending a 
delegation headed by Aleksander Kerinsky to Kiev. There a compromise was reached 
whereby the Rada would make no further demands for autonomy until the convocation of 
an All-Russian constituent assembly. In the meantime, the Rada’s newly formed General 
Secretariat, led by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, was granted limited authority over five 
                                                 
3 Dnieper Ukraine refers to the territory that roughly corresponded to the area of Ukraine within the 
Russian Empire.  
4 Specifically, this entailed the separation of nine Ukrainian provinces into a special administrative area. 
5 First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada. in Hunczak, Taras and Roman Sol’chanyk eds. Ukrains’ka 
suspil’no-polytichna dumka v 20 stolitti: dokumenty I materiialy, Vol.1. 295-298. Cited in Magosci, Paul. A 
History of Ukraine. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1996.475. 
6First Universal, Hunczak, Taras, 1932, and Von der Heide, John T. The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in 
Revolution. Harvard University Press;Cambridge, Mass;: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977.382-
385. 
7 Magosci, Paul. A History of Ukraine. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1996.472. 
8 Doroshenko, Dmytro Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917-1923 rr. Uzhhorod:Svoboda, 1932.,95. 
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Ukrainian provinces.9 Recognition by the Provisional government raised the prestige of 
the Rada and further legitimized its authority.10  
Ukrainians endorsed the Rada and largely rejected Bolshevism. Shortly after it 
was established, the Rada enjoyed considerable peasant support due to its willingness to 
address crucial land concerns. For the peasants, the primary concern was not nationalism 
or autonomy, but rather in obtaining additional land.11 As George Luckyj has noted, 
results of the elections to the 1917 Constituent Assembly reveal broad support for the 
Rada among the Ukrainian population.12 While in Russia forty percent of the votes to the 
Constituent Assembly were for the Bolsheviks, in Ukraine the Bolsheviks garnered only 
about 10 percent of votes cast. 13 According to election returns, the Ukrainian parties 
outgained the Bolsheviks by a wide margin in all but one (Kherson) of the nine Ukrainian 
districts polled.14 Reflecting on the strength of Ukrainian nationalism in his study on the 
election, Oliver H. Radkey noted that “(h)owever one may estimate the strength of 
Ukrainian separatism, no one can deny that Little Russian particularism has real force 
behind it.” 15 While support for the Bolsheviks in Russia grew rapidly—the Bolshevik 
                                                 
9 The Rada’s Second Universal, issued on July 16, outlined the compromise with the Provisional 
government. The five provinces included in the Secretariat’s control were: Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, 
Poltava, Chernihiv. 
10 Magosci, Paul. A History of Ukraine. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1996. 477. 
11 Ibid. 477 
12 Luckyj, George. Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine 1917-1934. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1990. 7 
13 Radkey, Oliver H. The Election to the Constituent Assembly of 1917.  Cited in: Liber, George. Soviet 
Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934. New 
York;Cambridge [England];: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 28. 
14 Radkey, Oliver H. The Election to the Constituent Assembly of 1917 Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1950.79. 
15 ibid. 17-18 
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party grew from 24,000 to 350,000 members between February and October alone— in 
Ukraine, membership was only about 22,000 by August of 1917.16  
On the night of November 6, 1917, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional 
government in Russia. They then used the Second Congress of Soviets17, which met in 
Petrograd, to establish the new government in Russia. The Council of People’s 
Commissars, as it was known, was led by Vladimir Lenin, with Leon Trotsky as 
commissar for foreign affairs, and Joseph Stalin as commissar for the nationalities.  In 
Ukraine, the Bolsheviks hoped to repeat their success by using the workers’ soviets to 
spread Bolshevism.18 However, when the Congress of Soviets met in Kiev on December 
17, 1917, the Bolsheviks, who had around 100 of 2,500 delegates, realized that they were 
far out-numbered by supporters of the Rada.19  
The Bolsheviks made a tactical retreat to Kharkiv, where on December 25, 1917, 
they established the Soviet Ukrainian government, known as the Ukrainian People's 
Republic of Soviets. The new government, led by the People’s Secretariat, consisted of 
twelve members, all of whom except one were Bolshevik.20 Receiving support from the 
Russian Soviet army, including a detachment of the Red Guard, the new Soviet Ukrainian 
government undertook a campaign to weaken the Central Rada and the Ukrainian 
National Republic and advance into Ukraine. The Russian Soviet government had 
denounced the Rada as reactionary and was opposed to the Rada’s claim of authority over 
                                                 
16 Magosci, Paul. A History of Ukraine. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1996. 478. 
17 The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which met from 
November 7–9, 1917 ratified the revolutionary transfer of state power. 
18 Subtelby or Magosci 
19 Magosci,  481. 
20 Ibid.481 
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Ukrainian units in the Russian army and to its recognition of the Don Cossack 
Republic,21 which was then becoming a center of counter-revolutionary activity.   
As Mikhailo Hurshevsky described: 
…bands of Bolshevik soldiers and Red Guards consisting of armed laborers and 
others in the service of the Bolsheviks, instead of going on to the Don to fight against the 
counterrevolutionists as they had said they would do, began to advance along the 
railroads into the heart of Ukraine, carrying their poisonous propaganda to the provinces 
of Poltava and Kherson;...(A)s soon as the Bolshevik bands arrived, various groups, 
mostly Jewish and Russian, caused insurrections in the cities at the stations along the 
railroads. Under the influence of their propaganda revolts broke out in the Ukrainian 
regiments newly organized or taken over by patriots; the soldiers were told that the 
struggle was against the capitalistic Central Rada and for the socialization of Ukraine. 
Many Ukrainian soldiers, or Kozaks as they were called, either joined the Bolsheviks, 
declared themselves neutral, or simply deserted their regiments and went home…22 
 
One day after the Bolsheviks took control of the government in Russia, the 
Ukrainian Rada, on November 08, 1917 condemned the coup and announced its intention 
to resist any similar attempt in Ukraine. The Rada and the Bolshevik government were 
incompatible from the outset,23 and despite early cooperation, they remained in 
opposition throughout the revolutionary period in Ukraine. On November 09, 1917, the 
Bolsheviks, representing the Russian Republic issued “The Declarations of the Rights of 
the People of Russia,” which stated:  
“The Councils of the People's Commissars, resolves to base their activity 
upon the question of the nationalities of Russia, as expressed in the following 
principles: 
1. The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.  
                                                 
21 The Don Cossack Republic was an independent self-proclaimed anti-Bolshevik republic, which existed 
during the Russian Civil War after the collapse of the Russian Empire from 1918 to 1920. 
22 Frederiksen, O. J. (ed )., and Mikhailo Hrushevsky. A History of Ukraine. New Haven: Yale University 
Press., 1941. 535. 
23 Reshetar, John Stephen. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952. Web. 91. 
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2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the 
point of separation and       the formation of an independent state.  
3. The abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges 
and disabilities.  
4. The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups 
inhabiting the territory of Russia. 24 
 
In spite of these stated beliefs, the Bolsheviks never supported Ukrainian 
nationalist ambitions and had no intention to let Ukraine become an independent state25. 
Rather, Lenin’s idea of national self-determination “became an important tactical weapon 
of the Bolsheviks.”26 It was Joseph Stalin, who later, in 1918, reiterated an important 
qualification to Lenin’s theory: only the toiling masses, and not the bourgeoisie, could 
legitimately exercise the right to national self-determination. 27 Stalin’s qualification to 
Lenin’s theory provided the ideological justification for the attack on the Rada and 
Ukrainian National Republic. Moreover, “The Declarations of the Rights of the People of 
Russia,” was a meaningless document anyway since most Bolsheviks could not even 
comprehend of a sovereign Ukrainian territory and were hostile towards its proponents. 
Mykola Skrypnik, the most prominent of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks stated:  
“For the majority of our Party members, the Ukraine as a national unit did not exist. 
There was Little Russia, an inseparable part of one unbreakable Russia; something not 
clear by its very nature; by its relations with Russia; as well as by its territory and by its 
language. As a last resort, a considerable part [of our Party members] recognized the 
existence of Little Russia, and some even of the Ukraine, but only within the framework 
of the so-called Western Lands, i.e.,Kien, Volyn, Podolia, and Poltava Gubernias. 
Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, the Donets and the Krivy Rog Basins, because of the knowledge 
                                                 
24 “The Rights of the People of Russia” The Nation .Vol. 109 Jul.-Dec. 1919. 
25 Sullivant, Robert S., 1925. Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962. 18. 
26 Luckyj, George. Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine 1917-1934. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1990. 8. 
27 Stalin, Joseph. Sochinenie  V.4.  Мoscow: Gosudarstvenoi Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1947. 31. 
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of the strength of the working class [there] and its Bolshevik Party, [were considered] a 
territory beyond the Ukraine. That territory had to be set against Ukraine.28 
 
In response to the “Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia,” the Rada 
issued, on November 20, 1917, its Third Universal, which established the Ukrainian 
People’s Republic in federation with Russia and other nationalities of the former Empire. 
The Third Universal, with its provisions for land redistribution, abolition of capital 
punishment, and the safeguarding of minority rights, proved to be a potent counter-
measure to Bolshevik propaganda in Ukraine.29 Additionally, freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, association, religion, strikes, person and domicile, and the right to employ 
local dialects and languages were deemed to be achievements of the Revolution, which 
must be protected.30  
Ukraine’s policy towards national minorities, adhering to the principle of 
“national-personal” autonomy proclaimed in the Third Universal, afforded rights to all 
national minorities living in Ukraine.31 Mykhailo Hrushevsky noted that, “(t)hrough the 
Central Rada the Ukrainian people gave a striking and concrete example of their desire to 
allow all national minorities the opportunity to pursue their own national development 
                                                 
28 Skrypnyk, Mykola. Statii  i Promovy Kharkhiv: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1930, I. 290-91. 
Cited in: Dmytryshyn, Basil. Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1953. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. 
24-25. 
 
29 Luckyj, George. Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine 1917-1934. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1990. 7 
30 Reshetar, John Stephen. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952. 90. 
31 Ibid. 90 
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and the preservation of their culture.”32 The Third Universal affirmed, “Let it be known 
that we recognize the right of the Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other people for nation-
personal autonomy in order to secure for themselves the right and the freedom of self-rule 
in questions of national life.” 33  
 
 
Soviets declare war on Ukraine 
As tensions grew between Petrograd and Kiev, the Bolsheviks sent an ultimatum 
demanding the Rada allow the free passage of the Red Army through Ukraine in its 
offensive against the White army. The Rada’s rejection of the ultimatum and its decision 
to continue to disarm Red Army soldiers in Ukraine led to a declaration of war by the 
Soviet government.34 The Bolsheviks, who viewed those involved in the Ukrainian 
movement as “enemies of the people,”35 marched on Kiev in early 1918.  In response to 
the continued Bolshevik invasion, the Rada issued its Fourth Universal, which 
proclaimed the existence of an independent Ukrainian National Republic.36 By virtue of 
its proclaimed sovereignty, the Ukrainian National Republic was in a position to reach a 
                                                 
32 Hrushevsky, Mykhailo “Speech on National Minorities” in Lindheim, Ralph and George S.N. Luckyj 
eds. Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine : An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995. 
Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996. 240. 
33 Third Universal, Hunczak, Taras, 1932, and Von der Heide, John T. The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in 
Revolution. Harvard University Press;Cambridge, Mass;: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977.385-
390. 
34 United States. Congress. House. Foreign Affairs. Favoring the Extension of Diplomatic Relations with 
the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia., Hearing Before..., 83-1, July 15, 1953. 103. 
35 Magosci, Paul. A History of Ukraine. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1996.481. 
36 Reshetar, John Stephen. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952. 111. 
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separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk and secure recognition of its 
independence.  
After the proclamation of the Fourth Universal, the Bolsheviks redoubled their 
efforts to reach Kiev. As John Reshetar, Jr. has noted, “(t)he determination of the Rada to 
make a separate peace…accelerated the Soviet invasion since such a treaty would have 
deprived Russia of badly needed grain by diverting it to the Central Powers.”37 The so-
called Ukrainian army, loyal to the Soviet Ukrainian government, was composed nearly 
entirely of Russian troops and was commanded by the Russian officer Mikhail 
Muravyev.38 Claiming that they were liberating Ukrainians from the control of the 
bourgeoisie, the Bolshevik Ukrainian army “abolished Ukrainian newspapers and…not 
only executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie, but also Ukrainian 
communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language.”39  On February 7, the Rada 
was forced to flee the Bolshevik advance on Kiev and took up residence in Zhytomyr, 
Ukraine.   
 
Brest-Litovsk 
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks negotiated to end Russia’s involvement in World War 
I in the town Brest-Litovsk, where Leon Trotsky claimed to speak for the entire former 
Russian empire.40 The Bolsheviks desperately needed to secure a peace in order to 
                                                 
37 Ibid.113. 




solidify their authority in Russia.41 For the Central Powers, it was vital to close the war 
on the eastern front and to secure foodstuffs and raw materials, which they intended to 
obtain from Ukraine. The Central Powers thus welcomed delegates from the Ukrainian 
National Republic to Brest-Litovsk.  A separate treaty was concluded with the Ukrainian 
government on February 09, 1918, some 10 hours before Kiev fell to the Bolsheviks.42 
According to the provisions of the treaty, both the Council of People’s Commissars and 
the Central Powers agreed to recognize Ukraine as an independent state.43 Soviet Russia 
also agreed specifically to “conclude a peace at once with the Ukrainian National 
Republic” and “to clear from the territory of Ukraine of all pro-Soviet troops.”44 The 
Central Powers agreed to return all Ukrainian prisoners of war and equip them for self-
defense and in any struggle which might occur with the Bolsheviks. However, the 
implementation of these provisions was contingent on the Ukrainian government’s ability 
to fulfill its treaty obligations, which included the supply of 1 million tons of grain to the 
Central Powers by July 31, 1918.45    
 
German occupation 
                                                 
41 Donaldson, Robert H., Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing 
Systems, Enduring Interests.  Fifth edition. ed. Armonk, New York;London, England;: M.E. Sharpe, 2014. 
48. 
42 Reshetar, John Stephen. The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952. 115. 
43 Frederiksen, O. J. (ed )., and Mikhailo Hrushevsky. A History of Ukraine. New Haven: Yale University 
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Under threat from Bolsheviks and amid chaos in Ukraine, the Central Rada 
realized that it could only survive with German aid. Ukraine’s position “was that of a 
state which voluntarily though reluctantly (agreed to accept a) great power’s protection 
with the inevitable imposition of certain restrictions on its sovereignty.”46  On February 
23, the Rada issued the following declaration to the Ukrainian people, explaining its 
decision to allow the Germans to enter Ukraine: 
…In order to put an immediate end to the pillaging of the Ukraine and to make possible, upon the 
conclusion of peace, immediate promulgation of laws to deal with the conditions of workers, the Council of 
People’s Ministers has accepted the military assistance of the friendly powers, Germany and Austria-
Hungary… 
They are coming to the Ukraine to suppress disorder and anarchy and to establish peace and 
order…They are coming purely to help our Cossacks who are staunchly defending our country, our land, 
and our freedom from the armed attacks of the Russian government, The Council of People’s Commissars, 
which, like the old Tsarist government, wished to subject the Ukraine to the authority of Russian capitalists, 
and thus enable the Russian people to live on the labor and wealth of the Ukraine.47 
At the request of the Rada, German and Austrian troops entered Ukraine, and 
backed by their support, the forces of the Ukrainian National Republic drove the 
Bolsheviks from Kiev on March 1, 1918. The first Bolshevik occupation of Kiev lasted 
just 20 days; as troops supporting the Rada advanced, the Soviet Ukrainian government 
fled to Soviet Russia. According to the agreements reached at Brest-Litovsk, and in 
return for military assistance, the new Ukrainian government was expected to supply 
massive quantities of grain and other resources. An enormous strain was placed on the 
Ukrainian government by its obligations to the Central Powers, and the necessity of 
procuring such large amounts of grain caused dissension among the peasantry, which 
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resulted in tension between peasants and the Central Rada.48 The inability of the 
Ukrainian government to provide the promised resources convinced the Germans that 
they needed to install their own Ukrainian government.  
Throughout the month of April, rumors were spreading in Kiev concerning the 
establishment of a new government. As the Rada’s influence waned, the ministers of 
justice, trade, and education, each of whom were members of the Socialist Federalist 
party, resigned their positions. 49 An increase in German intervention in Ukrainian 
internal affairs resulted in a harsh condemnation of the policy by the Rada, but the 
government was powerless to take any other action. The German policy of forced grain 
requisitioning from Ukraine for the war effort began causing major dissent among the 




 of April, representatives of the Central Powers met 
to plan the demise of the Central Rada after the governments of Germany and Austria-
Hungary lost faith in the Rada’s ability to provide the requisite foodstuffs. The chief of 
staff of the German Army met with Pavlo Skoropadskyi, a prominent landowner, to 
propose that he become the ruler of Ukraine.50 
 On April 28, 1918, the Central Rada met for the last time and elected Professor 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky President of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. “The next day,” 
as Dmytro Doroshenko recounted: 
 “…a German military detachment entered the building of the Central Rada, interrupting the 
session, and searched all members for weapons under the pretext of a conspiracy being concocted against 
the German military forces. On the morrow an imposing Congress of about 8,000 landowners and well-to-
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do peasants from all parts of Ukraine assembled in Kiev called by the “Union of Landowners,” and 
proclaimed as Hetman of the Ukraine Pavlo Skoropadski, a General formerly in Russian service, now in 
Ukrainian.”51 
 
By the end of April 1918 the Ukrainian state, founded on socialist principles, came to be 
represented by the Hetman Skoropadskyi, one of the largest private landowners in 
Ukraine.52 
 
Establishment of Hetmanate/cultural achievements 
The second phase of the Ukrainian revolution, the period known as the Hetmanate 
lasted fewer than eight months, from late April to mid-December 1918. Elected by the 
“Congress of Landowners,” and representing their interests, Hetman Skoropadskyi also 
allied himself with the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which had seen its 
land confiscated by decree of the Third Universal. Like the land-holding interests, the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church sought political and social stability, and in exchange for the 
return of its lands, the Church gave its blessing to the Skoropadskyi regime.53 
Skoropadsky also advocated for the establishment of an autocephalous Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church, a concept which was inspired by the revolution. 54  While the Rada had 
mostly ignored the Church, the Skoropadskyi government demanded independence for 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow patriarchate.55 With the support of the 
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economic elite, the blessing of the Orthodox Church, and the backing of the German 
army, the Hetman Skoropadskyi commenced dissolving the Rada and local land 
committees. Within a few months a bureaucratic apparatus was reinstated in Ukraine, as 
the Hetman tried to restore order. Skoropadskyi, despite reversing many of the 
achievements of the Ukrainian revolution, made major contributions towards the 
promotion of Ukrainian culture. In addition to the creation of several million Ukrainian 
textbooks and the introduction of Ukrainian language in schools, the Skoropadskyi 
government established an infrastructure for education.56 Around 150 new Ukrainian-
language schools were opened, primarily in rural areas.57 In October of 1918, two new 
Ukrainian universities were founded and a national archive was established. However, 
the most remarkable achievement in the field of education during the Hetmanate was the 






Opposition to the Hetman 
The Skoropadskyi government, with a blend of monarchical, republican, and most 
prominently, dictatorial features afforded its citizens some basic civil rights and placed a 
strong emphasis on the inviolability of private ownership.58 However, although this new 
government claimed to represent the interests of Ukraine, it was largely composed of 
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“men who had done nothing to win political independence for the Ukraine, and were 
opposed by the Ukrainian parties which wore the Ukrainian national colors.” 59 This was 
due to the rejection by Ukrainian nationalists of the Hetman’s invitation to join the 
government. Instead, the Ukrainian parties formed the “Ukrainian National Union.”  
Headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and composed of the socialist elements opposed to 
the Hetman, the Ukrainian National Union wanted to create a parallel government in 
Ukraine. Also in opposition to the Skoropadskyi regime was the peasantry, who were 
victimized by the Hetman’s policies. Not only was food being requisitioned by force 
from the countryside, but the land itself was reclaimed when the Hetman reinstituted 
private ownership of land. As the collection of food for transport to the Central Powers 
proceeded more rapidly, the Ukrainian countryside erupted in violent opposition. “From 
the middle of 1918,” wrote Richard Pipes “the entire Ukraine became the scene of a 
growing peasant rebellion.”60  
 
Hoping to capitalize on peasant unrest, leftist elements within Ukrainian 
Bolshevik Communist Party (CP(b)U61), which was subordinate to the Russian 
Communist Party, prepared to incite a peasant rebellion in Ukraine. Throughout the 
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summer, more and more often, peasant discontent manifested itself in “riots and acts of 
incendiarism.”62 From the outset the biggest problem for the CP(b)U, widely perceived as 
foreign to Ukraine, was building an indigenous power base.”63 The Bolsheviks that 
remained in Ukraine estimated that by the late summer of 1918 the time had become ripe 
for an insurrection:  
“The general political conditions at that time were most favorable [sic!]. German rule, violence, 
and the indemnities which the conquerors widely imposed, tortures, mass executions, punitive expeditions, 
the burning of villages, the destruction of all peasant and worker organizations, the nullification of all the 
achievements of the Revolution, starvation wages, ruined enterprises, the high price of all necessities, and, 
finally, the complete return to the landowners and factory proprietors of all their previous privileges—all 
this provided splendid soil for the widespread growth of the revolutionary movement and for the 
development of an active will to fight among the masses.”64   
On August 5, the KP(b)U called for general uprising in Ukraine, the decree stated: “(we 
must) quickly begin military activity against the enemies of the workers and the peasants 
in Ukraine.”65 But despite the favorable political climate for rebellion, the August 1918 
uprising was a failure. In most of the regions in Ukraine, there was no response at all to 
the Bolshevik declaration. The “sporadic and half-hearted” revolts that did occur were 
easily suppressed by German troops.66 When the KP(b)U met again in October of 1918 at 
its Second Congress, internal politics were dominated by the rightists and Stalin was 
made a permanent member of the KP(b)U. The main tasks of the party were formulated 
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and included the preparation of Ukraine for Bolshevik military action, which was to 
coincide with the demise of the Skoropadskyi regime.67 
 
Skoropadskyi’s downfall 
The demise of the Skoropadskyi regime ultimately came not at the hands of the 
Bolsheviks, but due to the close of the First World War. The Hetman’s authority was 
entirely dependent on the German military, so as the end of the war drew nearer and it 
became apparent that the German army would soon leave, Skoropadskyi’s regime began 
to lose its authority.68 Confronted with the potential collapse of his regime, the Hetman’s 
government tried to negotiate with the Entente powers and also with the Ukrainian 
National Union, headed at that time by Volodymyr Vinnichenko. In late October, the 
National Union and the Skoropadskyi government reached an agreement whereby a new 
cabinet was formed including five members from the Ukrainian National Union. But the 
cooperation between the two administrations was short-lived, and within weeks their 
relationship had deteriorated to the point that National Union decided to organize a 
“long-prepared” insurrection against Skoropadskyi.69 
 With the end of the war in sight and the realization that his hold on power was 
decreasing, the Hetman Skoropadskyi became desperate. Hoping to save his regime and 
at the same time impress the Allies, the Hetman formed a new cabinet, renounced 
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Ukraine’s independence, and declared a federative Union between Ukraine and a future 
non-Bolshevik Russia.70  On November 14
th
 he issued an edict:  
Before us now stands a new political task. The Allies have long been the friends of the former 
great and united Russian state. Now…the conditions of its future existence have definitely changed. The 
former vigor and strength of the All-Russian state must be restored on the basis of the federative principle. 
In this federation, the Ukraine deserves to play one of the leading roles…Deeply convinced that any other 
policy would mean the destruction of the Ukraine, I appeal to all who cherish her future to unite around me 
and stand in the defense of the Ukraine and Russia.71 
 
Skoropadskyi’s attempt to seek a Russian alliance convinced the Ukrainian 
National Union to form its own government, the Directory. The Directory immediately 
declared Skoropadskyi’s government invalid and with the support of the Sich Riflemen 
among others,72 they began to march toward Kiev on November 18. As the forces of the 
Directory drew closer to Kiev, they halted to avoid coming into conflict with the German 
army, which continued to protect the Hetman.73 The standoff was ended by the German 
Command, which made an agreement not to engage the Directory’s army and to 
withdraw German troops from the city on December 14, 1918.74 Just prior to the entry of 
Kiev by Directory forces, the Hetman Skoropadskyi issued his final pronouncement, a 
declaration of abdication: 
I, Hetman of Ukraine, have employed all my energies during the past seven and one-half months in an 
effort to extricate the Ukraine from the difficult situation in which she finds herself. God has not given me 
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the strength to deal with this problem, and now, in light of conditions which have arisen and acting solely 
for the good of Ukraine, I abdicate all authority.75 
 
Anarchy 
The third period of the Ukrainian revolution began in the year 1919 and found 
Ukraine in complete chaos and lawlessness, with multiple forces vying for control of the 
country. As Orest Subtelny wrote, “…in the modern history of Europe, no country 
experienced such complete anarchy, bitter civil strife and total collapse of authority as did 
Ukraine at this time.”76 Beset by peasant violence and political instability, Ukraine was 
further devastated by the economic hardships caused by the war and by the German 
occupation. Inflation was such that in late 1918 the price of goods was twenty-four times 
than it had been just six years prior.77 Ukraine was also at the mercy of gangs of armed 
peasants, who robbed and killed indiscriminately. Peasants looted estates, murdered their 
inhabitants and occasionally launched major raids on cities.78 Those living in villages 
literally barricaded themselves in their homes against hordes of intruders and strangers, 
many of whom had fled the dying cities in search of food.79 For most of the year, the 
entire country was at their mercy. Richard Pipes offers the following description:  
The year 1919 in Ukraine was a period of complete anarchy. The entire territory fell apart into 
innumerable regions isolated from each other and from the rest of the world, dominated by armed bands of 
peasants or freebooters who looted and murdered with utter impunity. In Kiev itself governments came and 
went, edicts were issued, cabinet crises were resolved, diplomatic talks were carried on—but the rest of the 
country lived its own existence where the only effective regime was that of the gun. None of the authorities 
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which claimed the Ukraine during the year following the deposition of Skoropadski ever exercised actual 
sovereignty. The Communists, who all along anxiously watched the developments there and did everything 
in their power to seize control for themselves, fared no better than their Ukrainian nationalist and White 
Russian competitors.80  
 
Following the ignominious departure of the Hetman—he fled Kiev disguised as 
German officer81—the Directory tried to establish its authority in Kiev, forming the 
government for a revived Ukrainian National Republic. The Directory, with an army 
commanded by Symon Petliura, had come to power with the cooperation of the 
Bolsheviks, with whom they’d struck a deal: the government in Moscow82 would agree to 
recognize the Directory’s authority in Ukraine after the fall of the Hetman and in 
exchange the new Ukrainian government would allow the Communist party to function 
on Ukrainian soil.83  On December 26
th
 1918, the Directory issued its own “Declaration,” 
a statement of goals indicating that it would attempt to restore order to the country while 
at the same time advancing revolutionary aims. To this end, the Directory promised to 
expropriate and redistribute large private landholdings, including those belonging to the 
state and the Church. The Directory called for the establishment of a “Worker’s 
Congress,” which was to represent the “toiling masses,” and proclaimed its intention to 
subjugate the bourgeoisie. On January 22 1919, exactly one year after the original 
declaration of Ukrainian independence, the Directory asserted its union with the West 
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Ukrainian National Republic, which had been formed in October of 1918. The act carried 
significant symbolic meaning, celebrating the long-awaited union between Ukrainian 
peoples in the east and in the west. 
 
Peasant movement 
As numerous groups competed for control over Ukraine, the land question 
remained the paramount concern for the peasantry. Historically, Ukrainian peasants, poor 
by European standards, were nevertheless much better off than those in Russia. Owing to 
the system of barschina84, which existed primarily in the southern parts of the Russian 
empire due to favorable soil conditions, peasants formed a stronger bond to the land on 
which they worked and lived.  Unconcerned with political and social revolutions the 
peasants were primarily motivated by a desire to secure more land,85 and accordingly, 
they allied themselves with whichever government they believed could fulfill this need. 
As Peter Kenez wrote:  
“The peasant movement, which developed in the years of chaos was stronger in the Ukraine than 
(in Russia). None of the governments, which changed with rapidity, was able to extend its rule over the 
countryside. The peasants rebelled against the cities, which were inhabited by Jews and Russians, and only 
wanted to take and were unable to give. The anti-urban ideology of the peasantry was utopian, and bound 
to be defeated, but it made the task of those who hoped to govern the country very difficult.”86 
Peasant armies had become a major force in Ukrainian society, capable of rising up 
against governments that threatened their well-being.  When the Skoropadskyi 
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government reversed the Rada’s land decree, the peasant masses revolted, killing 15,000 
German military personnel between April and June of 1918 alone.87 As the Directory 
army rose to eliminate the Skoropadskyi regime, its 100,000 strong ranks were filled with 
peasant volunteers. However, the peasants were hardly a unified force, consisting of 
“some village elders and schoolteachers, (and) led by self-proclaimed leaders 
(otamany88)… whose only real common bond was opposition to Skoropads’kyi’s rule.”89 
By early 1919, when it became clear that the Directory was incapable of delivering on its 
promises to redistribute land, the peasants switched their allegiances to the Bolsheviks, 
signaling the demise of the Directory. Thus, in late 1918 and early 1919, the peasant 
masses, in two major uprisings, directly impacted the collapse of two separate Ukrainian 
governments.90 The third peasant revolt in 1919 was by far the most the most tragic, 
where numerous peasant armies committed hundreds of brutal pogroms in Ukraine. This 
period of violent antisemitism, when between 50,000 and 60,00091 were massacred, is 
viewed as the largest modern mass killing of Jews prior to World War Two. One cause 
for peasant unrest was the establishment of a Soviet government in Ukraine which 
viewed the peasants as enemies. 92 
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Bolsheviks and peasant pogroms 
The Ukrainian Soviet government alienated the peasantry by instituting a system 
which used Bolshevik-controlled councils to establish communal farming for the purpose 
of grain confiscation. 93 When Ukrainian Soviet Republic came to power, thousands of 
Bolshevik cadres were dispatched to the Ukrainian countryside where they came into 
conflict with peasants.94 As peasants rebelled against Bolshevik attempts to requisition 
grain, many old anti-Semitic tendencies prevailed.  As Orest Subtelny states, although 
most Jews were apolitical, “…it is a fact that Jews were also disproportionately 
prominent among the Bolsheviks, notably in their leadership, among their tax and grain-
gathering officials, and especially in the despised and feared Cheka.”95 Many peasants 
came to view the Bolsheviks and the Jews as one in the same, conflating blame for one 
with the other. In a letter written by the otaman Struka and printed in the newspaper 
“Union” on October 17th, the warlord attempted to justify the brutality against the Jews: 
I am not denying that there were instances when the Jewish population suffered at the hands of the 
insurgents, but this happened only because the majority of the Red Army is composed of Jews who raided 
and destroyed our property and our families and displayed inhuman cruelty in their repressions.96  
Foreign invasion 
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Amid social chaos, political instability also reigned in Ukraine, as six different 
armies, the Ukrainians, the Whites, the Entente, the Bolsheviks, the Poles, and the 
anarchists competed for control over the country. 97 With few solid plans for 
administering order internally, the Directory also faced multiple threats from foreign 
armies on its soil. In December 1918, the Entente, in an attempt to block the spread of 
bolshevism, landed 60,000 troops in Russian and Ukraine. The Western powers intended 
to provide military support for the anti-Bolshevik White forces, which planned to launch 
from its stronghold in the Don region a campaign to restore the former unity of the 
Russian empire. In the south, the French attempted a military occupation in several Black 
sea ports,98 but failed in their efforts and withdrew on April 6 to avoid a direct military 
conflict with the Soviets.99 The Ukrainians and the Whites were naturally incompatible 
allies. Other than their mutual opposition to Bolshevism, the two had nothing in common, 
and the Whites were openly hostile to Ukrainian nationalist ambitions. However, 
although they would hold most of the Left Bank100 by August of 1919101, the Whites were 
not the most immediate concern for the Directory, whose intelligence indicated that, in 
the north, the Bolsheviks were planning a second occupation of Ukraine.102 Claiming that 
they were going to help the Ukrainian “workers” to get a “Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
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Republic,” the Bolsheviks began to move troops into Ukraine in order to reassert their 
authority in Ukraine.103  
 
The army abandons the Directory 
In Kiev, the Directory forces were dwindling as peasants deserted in large 
numbers. Believing that they had removed the threat to their livelihood, the Hetman 
Soropadskyi, and indifferent to the fate of the Directory,104 large numbers of peasants 
returned to their villages.105 Also, Bolshevik agitation was more successful than in the 
previous assault on Kiev, and the peasant masses were falling prey to “extremist 
demagogic agitation,”106 The army of the Directory, which had dropped in size from 
100,000 to 25,000,107 was not sufficiently strong to repel the Bolshevik attack. As Soviet 
troops began occupying towns in Ukraine, representatives from the Directory officially 
protested to Moscow. Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Grigorii Chicherin, 
responded:   
We must advise you that your information concerning the advance of our troops into the territory 
of Ukraine does not correspond with the facts…There is no army of the Russian Soviet Republic on 
Ukrainian territory…Between Ukraine and Russia there are at present no armed conflicts. The Directory 
cannot be unaware that the government of the Russian Socialist Republic has no aggressive intentions 
against the independence of the Ukraine, and that already in the spring of 1918 our government dispatched 
a war greeting to the Ukrainian [Soviet] government, which had come into existence at that time.108 
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Establishment of Soviet Power 
On January 3
rd
 1919, Soviet troops entered Kharkiv, prompting the Directory to 
issue a final ultimatum to Moscow to immediately withdraw its troops. When the Soviets 
refused, the Directory issued its own declaration of war on January 18. By February of 
1919, just two months after it came to power, the Directory was forced out of Kiev, 
where it took up residence in Vynnytsia. Symon Petliura increasingly took a more 
prominent role in the leadership of the Directory until he finally replaced Volodymyr 
Vynnychenko, who sought refuge abroad. Petliura’s army entered Kiev on August 31, 
1919, but found the city occupied by the White forces, who had all but forced out the 
Bolsheviks. The two anti-Bolshevik armies fought on the streets of Kiev, compelling 
Petliura’s army to evacuate to avoid doing further harm to the city.109 As Petliura sought 
support from Poland, the fighting continued between the Whites and the Bolsheviks for 
Kiev. But despite support from the Allies, in February 1920, the White army of General 
Deniken110 conceded defeat to the superior Red Army, which numbered 1.5 million men 
by fall of 1919.111 Also, the remnants of the Galician Army,112 which had joined the 
Whites, became part of the Bolshevik Red Army.113As Soviet power established itself in 
Ukraine, the former Ukrainian government and peasants continued to fight against the 
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Bolsheviks for several more years. However, by 1920 individual efforts to create an 
independent Ukrainian state were beginning to come to an end.  
 
By December of 1920, with the forces of the revolution mostly spent, Russia 
attempted to normalize relations with its border lands. Although insurrection against the 
Soviet authorities continued after the Bolsheviks took Kiev—the Ukrainian government 
in exile in Poland still maintained contact with some of Petliura’s otamany near Kiev and 
Nestor Makhno114 held out until late summer of 1921—the Bolsheviks ultimately broke 
the Ukrainian partisan movement by committing over 50,000 troops to the issue, most of 
whom were members of the feared Cheka.115 Nevertheless, Ukrainians still had reason to 
hope that they would be allowed to secure the gains of the revolution and expand them 
still further. The relationship between the Russian and Ukrainian states during the 
turbulent revolution, however, would come to define future relations between the 
peoples. 
During the Ukrainian revolution several key elements played a significant role in 
the relationship between the Ukrainian and Bolshevik governments. The establishment of 
Ukraine as a distinct geographical area, which was essentially rural and decidedly non-
Russian,116 necessitated its domination by the Bolsheviks. The cities, as Mykhailo 
Hrushevsky wrote, “are not Ukrainian in population and are often centers of anti-
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Ukrainian feeling, demonstrations, and manifestations which undermine our statehood 
and thereby evoke dismay in Ukrainian society.”117 The perceived backwardness of the 
peasants inspired enmity among the Bolsheviks, who oriented towards an all-Russian 
identity. Another element that defined the relationship concerns the indispensability of 
Ukraine for the Bolsheviks.118 In addition to its human capital, Ukraine contained vital 
agricultural and mineral resources which were crucial to the establishment of Soviet 
authority in Ukraine. Leninist doctrine promoted the idea that the Bolsheviks could not 
win without local support, and so it was imperative to try to appeal to the Ukrainian 
masses.  
The presence of foreign armies on Ukrainian soil impacted the relationship 
between the Ukrainian and Russian governments significantly during the revolution.  
Foreign armies contributed to the chaos and brutality of the revolutionary period by 
disrupting the development of independent local groups, whether nationalist or 
Bolshevik, which encouraged repeated Russian intervention into Ukraine.119 During the 
chaos of the Ukrainian revolution, foreign armies, notably the German army, arrived in 
Ukraine with the intent to extract its natural resources for the war effort; once the 
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Germans left, the Bolshevik Soviet government asserted its authority over Ukraine. The 
national awareness and impetus to fight for the national idea was not sufficiently 
developed among the Ukrainian masses to successfully overcome the obstacles presented 
by foreign occupation, which left Ukraine at the mercy of its invaders. Writing on 
totalitarianism, Hanna Arendt’s apt summary could be easily applied to Ukraine, she 
wrote:   
The conqueror either wanted nothing but spoils and would leave the country after the looting; or 
he wanted to stay permanently and would then incorporate the conquered territory into the body politic and 
gradually assimilate the conquered population to the standard of the mother country.   
However, the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine did not necessarily mean that 
nationalist ambitions had been thwarted. On the contrary, with the formation of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainians nationalists were able to realize some of 
their dreams regarding statehood. Under the Soviets, Ukraine finally became a clearly 
defined geographical and national entity, which maintained its own administrative center 
and apparatus. After centuries without representation, Ukraine finally received a 
territorial and administrative framework which reflected the national identity of its 
people.120  
 





                                                 








Part 2: Soviet Ukrainian literary activity and the literary policy of the Communist 
Party  
 
At the end of the revolutionary period, though the country was in ruins, the 
national spirit endured in the unprecedented amount of literary activity that took place in 
Ukraine. Most writers were affiliated with a particular literary group, which published a 
literary journal that served as a forum for its political views and featured the works of its 
members. During the Ukrainian literary renaissance formerly unknown writers were 
lionized and came to occupy a prominent place in society. However, most enjoyed their 
fame only briefly: as the Party relaxed its support for the drive for Ukrainianization121, 
the persecution of Ukrainian writers increased. The writers of the Ukrainian literary 
renaissance became the “executed renaissance,” and the state later attempted to obliterate 
their memory in the public record. Mykola Khvylovy, the most outstanding writer from 
the era of the “executed renaissance,” espoused a path for the development of Ukrainian 
literature that would be: “on no account by the Russian. That is definite and 
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unconditional. Our political union must not be confused by literature.”122 Khvylovy ideas 
brought him in direct conflict with the Party’s views on literature, and more ominously 
with Stalin himself, who deplored Khvylovy’s “ridiculous and non-Marxist attempt to 
divorce culture from politics.” 123  
In this chapter I would like to focus first on the policies of the Soviet government 
that contributed to an initial flourishing of post-revolutionary cultural and literary activity 
in Ukraine. By observing the link between politics and literature in Soviet Ukrainian 
literary activity, I will attempt to demonstrate the crucial role that many of Ukraine’s 
literary intelligentsia continued to play in attaining some measure of cultural autonomy 
through their literary/political endeavors. In reaction to attempts by Ukrainians to define 
proletarian literature by Ukrainian standards, Soviet literary policy became increasingly 
more restrictive of their literary activity. The literary life and the polemics of Mykola 
Khvylovy, during his time in the literary organizations Hart and VAPLITE, demonstrates 
the struggle, which continued to be waged by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, not only 
against official Party repression, but also against the current of philistinism in literature, 
which threatened to destroy art itself.  
 
Ukrainianization: 
Purpose, ideological antecedents 
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Broadly speaking, the Soviet policy of Ukrianianization, was intended to 
legitimize Soviet rule in Ukraine by appealing to a greater percentage of the local 
population.124  During this time, emphasis was placed on developing local language and 
culture through the accompanying policy of korenizatsia (indigenization). Though it was 
not officially implemented until 1923, many of the concepts which formed the basis for 
the policy of Ukrianianization have their origins in the Eighth Congress of the Russian 
Bolshevik Communist Party (RCP(b) of 1919, where it was established that in order to 
foster better relations between the proletarians and semi-proletarians of various 
nationalities, it was necessary to recognize the equality of all nationalities.125  In an 
attempt to encourage cooperation between the cities and the countryside, the Party 
adopted a program of cultural education, through which it could educate the non-Russian 
peoples living in the border lands.126 The Tenth Party Congress met in 1921 and 
established a framework to help the non-Russian working masses in their struggle for 
equality, resolving to:  
1. develop and strengthen the Soviet state system in forms which correspond to the national 
conditions of these non-Russians; 
2. develop and strengthen the use of native languages in the courts, administration, economic organs, 
organs of power, which would be staffed by local people who know the way of life and 
psychology of the local population; 
3. develop the press, school, theaters, clubs and all cultural-educational institutions in the native 
languages; and  
4. create a wide net of course and schools, general education as well as professional-technical 
schools in the native languages, in order to quickly prepare skilled workers and soviet and party 
workers from the local population in all spheres, especially in the sphere of education.127 
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By appealing to hopes for a national revival among the Ukrainian people, the Party 
sought to attract the masses to its ideology. However, its intent was never to promote 
Ukrainian nationalism as such; in fact, the concept of nationalism was inherently 
contradictory to Party philosophy. The Party viewed nationalism as a detriment to the 
revolution because it took the focus off of the class struggle.  Lenin expounded on the 
incompatibility between Marxism and nationalism: 
Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even of the “most just”, “purest”, most refined 
and civilised brand. In place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the 
amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity, a unity that is growing before our eyes with every mile of 
railway line that is built, with every international trust, and every workers’ association that is formed (an 
association that is international in its economic activities as well as in its ideas and aims).128  
 
Lenin believed that nationalism and national movements were manifestations of the 
capitalist era, when imperial powers “subjugated colonial regions and enslaved them to 
the advantage of the ruling classes.”129 Nationalism, Lenin asserted, was a transitory 
phenomenon which would ultimately become superfluous in the new proletarian era. In 
the meantime, however, it was imperative to eliminate great-Russian chauvinism by “a 
gradual destruction of the suspicions and antagonisms which had given it birth.”130  
Indigenization and the Influence of the city on the countryside 
 The policy of Ukrianianization was instituted in an attempt to broaden the level of 
support among the peasantry for Bolshevik principles and to attempt to incorporate the 
population into local government and into the Party apparatus. In Ukraine, the joining of 
the proletariat and peasantry was complicated by the fact that adherents to Bolshevism 
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were far more prominent in the Russified cities of Ukraine than they were in the 
countryside. At fundamental issue was the disparity between the national composition of 
the proletariat and of the peasantry.  
In Ukraine, the vast majority of the population lived rurally, however the cities 
were largely composed of non-Ukrainians. In 1920, only fifteen percent of Soviet 
Ukraine’s population lived in cities.131 The cultural influence of the city overshadowed 
that of the countryside and complicated efforts to assimilate the peasants among the 
proletariat. Joseph Stalin addressed the lack of mass support among the peasantry by 
proposing the formation of Marxist cadres, which would interact and form close ties to 
the local population. He assessed the problem in Ukraine in the following way:  
The second weak point of Soviet power is the Ukraine. The situation in the Ukraine is further complicated 
by certain peculiarities in the industrial development of the country. The problem lies in the fact that the 
basic industries, coal and metallurgy, have been established in Ukraine, not from below, not as the result of 
the natural development of the national economy, but from above, as the result of an imposition artificially 
planted from outside. And this peculiarity leads to the result that…the joining of the proletariat with the 
peasantry has been considerably delayed by these differences in national composition…132 
Central to Stalin’s policy was the need to integrate ethnic Ukrainians into the positions of 
local leadership in Ukraine. As Terry Martin has pointed out, Korenizatsiia was a “deeply 
psychological strategy,” relying on the work of those who believed strongly in the 
national movement, its effectiveness as a strategy was due in part to the fact that 
indigenization was presented as an essential goal.133  
Having identified the crisis which existed in the countryside, the Party made the 
first steps toward accelerating the process of Ukrianianization. Yet, the problem remained 
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of how to Ukrianianize state and local institutions which were primarily composed of 
ethnic Russians. Ethnic Ukrainians were poorly represented among the leadership in 
Ukraine, leading Stalin to lament that, “the state apparatus (in Ukraine) is hardly nearer to 
the people and customs than in Turkestan.”134 The underrepresentation of Ukrainians in 
the Party (only 23% at this time) was evident in the composition of the government in 
Ukraine, where fewer than 35% of government employees were ethnic Ukrainian.135 
 
 
Political ukrainianization and Party concessions 
To remedy the situation, in July of 1923, the Party made changes among the 
leadership positions of the Ukrainian People’s Commissariat, which included the removal 
of its opportunistic former leader, Khristian Rakovskii, who supported Ukrainian 
nationalism only in furtherance of his own personal ambitions, in favor of Vlas Chubar, a 
native Ukrainian and the son of poor peasants, who would, it was expected, show greater 
concern for Ukrainian institutions. Notably, Oleksandr Shumsky, from his newly-
appointed position as Director of Agitation and Propaganga, a position which tasked him 
with leading educational work within the Party, continued to advocate for a policy of 
accelerated Ukrainianization.    
Instituted at a time when the Party was compelled to make concessions towards 
nationalist ambitions, the policy of Ukrianianization aimed at reforming multiple areas of 
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society. Recognizing the lack of support among the peasantry for Bolshevism, the Party 
made efforts towards compromising with nationalist elements in Ukraine. At the Fourth 
Congress of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, it was declared that: 
In an effort to win the support of the masses of the local population it is necessary in a greater 
degree than in the central regions to meet halfway either revolutionary-democratic elements or even those 
merely loyal in their attitude to Soviet Power…The border regions are so poor in local intellectual workers 
that each of them through all efforts must be drawn to the side of Soviet power.136 
In addition to political Ukrianianization, the state attempted to incorporate Ukrainian 
language and culture within the educational system and, thereby, increase representation 
among Ukrainians within the Party. One of the early results, which evinced the hope that 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia had for the program, was the influx of Ukrainian dissidents, 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky among them, who returned from exile to participate in 
Ukrainianization efforts. Hrushevsky was appointed director of the Ukrainian Academy 
of Sciences, where he developed a program of studies in Ukrainian history.  
However, this period of relaxed Party control was short-lived. In a letter to Lazar 
Kaganovich Stalin reiterated the Party’s need to maintain control over the 
Ukrainianization movement, stating:  
It is true that a wide movement toward [the development of] Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian 
social life has started and is gaining strength in the Ukraine. It is true that on no account should it be 
allowed to fall into the hands of elements that are hostile to us. It is true that many Communists in the 
Ukraine do not understand the meaning and importance of this movement and therefore do not take steps to 
dominate it…It is true that one must carefully select and create cadres of people who would be capable of 
mastering this new movement in the Ukraine.137 
 
By early 1926, a political crisis known as the “Shumsky affair,” signaled the end of 
compulsory Ukrainianization. 
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The Shumsky Affair 
The Shumsky affair signaled a shift in the Party’s implementation of its 
Ukrainianization program and demonstrated the lengths that the Party would go to 
demonize perceived manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism in Soviet politics. In March 
of 1926, Lazar Kaganovich, then First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, 
proposed at a Politburo meeting that the Party no long forcibly Ukrainianize the 
proletariat. Shumsky, concerned that Kaganovich’s proposal would send a dangerous 
signal of weakness regarding the Party’s ability to enforce its indigenization policy,138 
vehemently protested Kaganovich’s position and decried the slow pace of 
Ukrainianization. Enraged at the dominance of the Russian communists within the Party 
and disgusted by the obsequiousness of his fellow Ukrainians, Shumsky lashed out at the 
entire Ukrainian Politburo: 
In the Party the Russian Communist dominates and conducts himself with suspicion and hostility—to speak 
mildly—towards the Ukrainian Communist. He dominates and by relying on the contemptible self-seeking 
type of Little Russian, who in all historical epochs has been equally unprincipled and hypocritical, slavishly 
two-faced, and traitorously sycophantic. He now prides himself in his false internationalism, boasts his 
indifferent attitude to things Ukrainian and is ready to spit upon the (perhaps even sometimes in Ukrainian), 
if that gives him the chance to serve and get a position.  139 
 
Shumsky’s reckless invective notwithstanding, it was his letter to Stalin 
requesting the removal of Kaganovich from his position in Ukraine that signaled his 
downfall. Asserting that those who actually believe in the cause of Ukrainian culture 
should lead the Ukrianianization movement, Shumsky proposed that Kaganovich be 
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replaced by an ethnic Ukrainian. While Stalin counseled patience to Shumsky, the 
politically savvy Kaganovich wrote his own letter to Stalin, in which he drew links 
between Shumsky with the Ukrainian nationalist writer Mykola Khvylovy. Attached to 
the letter were the polemical writings of Khvylovy, which advocated for a Ukrainian 
literature independent of Russia. Stalin was especially concerned with the nationalist 
sentiment in Khvylovy’s political pamphlets, and he criticized Shumsky for his defense 
of Khvylovy.140 In April of 1926, Stalin replied to Kaganovich that: 
Comrade Shums’kyi does not realize that in the Ukraine, where the Communist cadres are weak, such a 
movement, led everywhere by the non-communist intelligentsia, may assume in places the character of a 
struggle for the alienation of Ukrainian culture from the all-Soviet culture, a struggle against “Moscow,” a 
struggle against the Russians, against Russian culture and against its greatest achievement, Leninism, 
altogether. I need not point out that such a danger grows more and more real in the Ukraine. I should only 
like to mention that even some Ukrainian Communists are not free from such defects. I have in mind that 
well known article by the noted Communist, Khvylovy, in the Ukrainian press. Khvylovy demands that the 
proletariat in the Ukraine be immediately de –Russified, his belief that “Ukrainian poetry should keep as far 
away as possible from Russian literature and style,” his pronouncement that “proletarian ideas are familiar 
to us without the help of Russian art,” his passionate belief in some messianic role for the young Ukrainian 
intelligentsia, his ridiculous and non-Marxian attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this and much 
more in the mouth of the Ukrainian Communist sounds (and cannot sound otherwise) more than 
strange.141    
Although Shumsky apologized for his attack on Kaganovich, he was unyielding in 
his views, and refused to succumb to pressure to denounce Khvylovy. 142 The Party was 
forced to acknowledge the dangers that Shumsky’s intransigence posed to its national 
policy. A joint letter from Kaganovich and Vlas Chubar to the Politbureau, written in 
June of 1924 warns that:  
One must reckon with the danger that as a result of the irresponsible behavior of Comrade Shumsky a 
reaction can set in causing a departure, at first psychological and then practical,  from the national policy of 
the Party, which is Ukrainianization. This would bring about a threat of greatest danger to the Party. 143 
 
                                                 
140 Martin, 215. 
141 Stalin,I.V. Collected Works. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953-54. Vol. 8 149-154. 
142 Luckyj, 69. 
143 Skrypnyk, M.  
 52 
In Party jargon “Shumskyism,” and later “Khvylovyism,” became euphemisms for the 
manifestation of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment in politics and literature. Shumskyism 
and Khvylovism rejected the Party doctrine of centralism. The national and personal 
freedoms that Shumsky and Khvylovy promoted within their respective spheres were 
viewed as subversive by the Party, which also recognized the propagandistic value of 
making these ideas into permanent political issues.144 Shumsky’s beliefs represented a 
challenge to the Party’s centralized authority and necessitated the particularly harsh 
attacks on his character and his expulsion from the Party.   
In 1933 Shumsky was arrested on charges that he belonged to a secretive 
counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet organization called the Ukrainian Military 
Organization (UVO), the existence of which was later shown to be entirely contrived by 
the NKVD.145 After originally receiving a sentence of ten years in a labor camp, 
Shumsky continued to assert his innocence in exile in Krasnoyarsk. Through letters to 
Stalin and hunger strikes, he protested the injustices of his case, but his sentence was 
never commuted. In spite of his poor health, Shumsky managed to live out the remainder 
of his sentence, but partial paralysis left him incapable of leaving the city. Shumsky died 
“suddenly” on September 18, 1946, by what appeared to be natural causes. However, 
according to Pavel Sudoplatov, Shumsky was poisoned at the behest of Nikita 
Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, because Shumsky 
had “established contacts with Ukrainian emigres…” and “…was plotting to join the 
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Ukrainian provisional government-in-exile.”146  However Shumsky died, he is significant 
for his impact on Ukrainian autonomy within the political sphere. Shumsky’s efforts to 
promote the acceleration of the Ukrainianization program exposed an ideological rift 
within the Party, which the Party leadership addressed by launching attacks on Shumsky 
and his ideas. The decline of his career paralleled a change in attitude towards the 
program by Party leaders, which ended compulsory Ukrainianization.    
 
Results of Ukrainianization 
Although the Ukrainianization program continued until the early 1930s, its 
political implications revealed the discord that existed among Party members; and Party 
leadership was more cognizant of the need to exercise control over the direction of the 
Ukrainianization movement. Shumsky’s overt nationalism, his vocal support for the 
acceleration of the Ukrainianization program, and his willingness to openly disagree with 
high-ranking Party members ultimately exposed him to allegations of 
counterrevolutionary activity. Despite the fact that the allegations were NKVD fantasies, 
they served their purpose, removing Shumsky from the Party and discrediting him and his 
ideas.   
Although Party rhetoric maintained the importance of pursuing its 
Ukrainianization policy, which had yielded some tangible, if problematic results, 
practical support for the movement diminished in the wake of the Shumsky affair. The 
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policy had created for the Party the unintended consequence of further inspiring 
nationalist ambitions among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the Party was compelled to 
qualify its position regarding the intended outcomes of Ukrainianization.  The June 1927 
Plenum of the CP(B)U, which issued its Theses on the Results of Ukrainization , declared 
that: 
The Party supports the wide use by the Ukrainian culture of all the treasures of world culture…However, in 
the Party’s view this cannot be done by contrasting Ukrainian culture with the cultures of other nations, but 
through brotherly cooperation between the working and toiling masses of all nationalities in the raising of 
an international culture to which the Ukrainian working class will be able to contribute its share.147 
 
Though implementation of the program continued, the détente with Ukrainian 
nationalist sentiment was over, and greater attention was paid to the assimilation of the 
Ukrainian population within the Soviet system. The Party, which earlier had warned of 
the dangers of Great Russian chauvinism, now spoke of the need to be vigilant about 
Ukrainian chauvinism, which promoted the concept of a necessary “struggle between two 
cultures.”148  The Plenum appealed to Party members to recall the advice of Lenin, who 
asserted that: 
When one speaks of the proletariat, then the opposition of the Ukrainian culture as a whole to the Great 
Russian culture as a whole means a shameful betrayal of the proletariat, in favor of bourgeois nationalism. 
If a Ukrainian Marxist is possessed by a quite natural hatred for his Great Russian oppressors, and if he 
transfers even a small part of this hatred, be it only a feeling of alienation, to the cause of the Great Russian 
proletariat, then this Marxist will fall into the mire of bourgeois nationalism.  
 
Despite the ideological battles provoked by Ukrainianization, the policy, in many 
ways, yielded positive results for the Party. While Ukrainians remained underrepresented 
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in Central Committee, the Party was able to attract many ethnic Ukrainians into its lower 
ranks. Between 1924 and 1933, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the Ukrainian 
Communist Party increased (from 33% to 60%).149 Also, an influx of Ukrainians from the 
countryside into the city impacted significantly the ethnic composition of cities and 
helped sustain the drive for industrialization. The cities of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and 
Luhansk became major industrial centers with large Ukrainian populations.  The policy 
of indigenization was particularly successful at the local level, where literacy rates in the 
countryside more than tripled from their prerevolutionary levels.150 Ukrainian was the 
language of instruction for over 97% of Ukrainian children, however only 30% of 
universities offered instruction in Ukrainian.151  
  The program of Ukrainianization, and in particular its policy of “indigenization,” 
contributed to a renaissance which occurred in Ukrainian culture in the 1920s. For the 
first time Ukrainian language and literature received official state recognition, and sincere 
efforts were made to promote the spread of Ukrainian culture. In the literary realm, the 
program contributed to an atmosphere of relative freedom, where writers were 
temporarily allowed to explore various methods of producing proletarian literature. An 
unprecedented amount of literary activity took place as a result, with various groups 
vying to promote their individual views on the direction that literature should take. 
Recognizing the propagandistic value of establishing a monopoly over literary 
expression, the Party formed its own literary groups, while monitoring closely the 
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activities of independent literary organizations. Party intrusion into literary life in 
Ukraine became increasingly common, dissenting writers were branded as “nationalist” 
and “deviationist.” “Shumskyism,” the epithet used to describe manifestations of 
Ukrainian nationalism in the political sphere, became known as “Khvylovyism” in 
literature, as the Party increasingly came to view any perceived manifestation of 









Early literary organization: 
Lenin and Proletkult 
While the Party sought to monopolize political power in the wake of the 
revolution, initially, it was not sufficiently strong enough to exert its full authority over 
literature. The first literary group to emerge, Proletkult, sought to provide literary 
education to the masses. However, once it tried to assert its independence in its own 
affairs, Proletkult became subject to repressive measures by the Party. The fundamental 
issue concerned the organization’s stated intent—to resist any interference in its activities 
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by the Party—which directly contradicted Lenin’s long-held theories on Party literature. 
Lenin’s concept focused on literature’s utilitarian value, stressing that literature must be 
subordinate to Party control. In 1905, Novaya Zhizn published Lenin’s decree on Party 
literature, in which he stated:  
What is this principle of party literature? It is not simply that, for the socialist proletariat, literature 
cannot be a means of enriching individuals or groups: it cannot, in fact, be an individual undertaking, 
independent of the common cause of the proletariat. Down with non-partisan writers! Down with literary 
supermen! Literature must become part of the common cause of the proletariat, “a cog and a screw” of one 
single great Social-Democratic mechanism set in motion by the entire politically-conscious vanguard of the 
entire working class. Literature must become a component of organised, planned and integrated Social-
Democratic Party work. 
“All comparisons are lame,” says a German proverb. So is my comparison of literature with a cog, 
of a living movement   with a mechanism. And I daresay there will ever be hysterical intellectuals to raise a 
howl about such a comparison, which degrades, deadens, “bureaucratises” the free battle of ideas, freedom 
of criticism, freedom of literary creation, etc., etc. Such outcries, in point of fact, would be nothing more 
than an expression of bourgeois-intellectual individualism. There is no question that literature is least of all 
subject to· mechanical adjustment or levelling, to the rule of the majority over the minority. There is no 
question, either, that in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed for personal initiative, 
individual inclination, thought and fantasy,, form and content. All this is undeniable; but all this simply 
shows that the literary side of the proletarian party cause cannot be mechanically identified with its other 
sides. This, however, does not in the least refute the proposition, alien and strange to the bourgeoisie and 
bourgeois democracy, that literature must by all means and necessarily become an element of Social-
Democratic Party work, inseparably bound up with the other elements. Newspapers must become the 
organs of the various party organisations, and their writers must by all means become members of these 
organisations. Publishing and distributing centres, bookshops and reading-rooms, libraries and similar 
establishments—must all be under party control. The organised socialist proletariat must keep an eye on all 
this work, supervise it in its entirety, and, from beginning to end, without any exception, infuse into it the 
life-stream of the living proletarian cause, thereby cutting the ground from under the old, semi-Oblomov, 
semi-shopkeeper Russian principle: the writer does the writing, the reader does the reading.152      
 
Although it was primarily a Russian organization, Proletkult was also present in 
Ukraine, until 1923, where it existed as a “well-organized network of literary 
workshops.”153 Its objective was “to render the workers class conscious, and thus to give 
them both the knowledge and the fighting impetus to enable them to achieve their historic 
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mission—the final overthrow of capitalism and the inauguration of the classless State.”154 
Driven by the critical need to educate the workers in the class struggle, the group hoped 
to raise awareness by establishing a system of reading groups and workshops in literature, 
drama, and the visual arts.  
Alexander Bogdanov, co-founder and chief theoretician of Proletkult, called for 
the total destruction of the old bourgeois culture, in favor of the “pure proletarian culture” 
of the future. However, it was the Proletkult’s policy of refusing to allow the Party to 
interfere in its affairs that made Party members suspicious. Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin’s 
wife, feared that the Proletkult “would detract workers from the important task of state 
construction and, because of its autonomy, turn into a haven for anti-Soviet forces.”155 
Bogdanov was arrested in September of 1920 for his alleged involvement with the 
“Worker’s Truth”156 movement. 
In October of 1920 Lenin wrote his draft resolution, “On Proletarian Culture,” 
which affirmed the right of the Party to oversee cultural affairs. It stated:  
Adhering unswervingly to this stand of principle, the All-Russia Proletcult Congress rejects in the most 
resolute manner, as theoretically unsound and practically harmful, all attempts to invent one’s own 
particular brand of culture, to remain isolated in self-contained organisations, to draw a line dividing the 
field of work of the People’s Commissariat of Education and the Proletcult, or to set up a Proletcult 
"autonomy" within establishments under the People’s Commissariat of Education and so forth. On the 
contrary, the Congress enjoins all Proletcult organisations to fully consider themselves in duty bound to act 
as auxiliary bodies of the network of establishments under the People’s Commissariat of Education, and to 
accomplish their tasks under the general guidance of the Soviet authorities (specifically, of the People’s 
Commissariat of Education) and of the Russian Communist Party, as part of the tasks of the proletarian 
dictatorship.157 
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On December 1, 1920, a decree was published in Pravda by the Party’s Central 
Committee that denounced Proletkult as a “petit bourgeois attempt to establish a power 
base outside ‘Soviet power’” and “a ‘haven for socially-alien elements.’”158  Following 
Lenin’s denunciations and Bogdanov’s arrest, the networks of the Proletkult groups 
disintegrated by 1923. Proletkult was significant because it represented an early attempt 
at independent literary organization. However, when it tried to exclude the Party from 
influencing its cultural efforts, Lenin and the Bolsheviks reacted by denouncing the 
Proletkult and affirming party control over the cultural education of the proletariate. The 
suppression of Proletkult marked the first major act of party control within the realm of 
literature.159  
 
So I assume the two subchapters below – fellow travelers and borotbists – ar not about 
“literary organizations” per se, because later you have a chapter titled “literary 
organizations.” Howver, since you talk about literary activity above, a reader may think 
that these are already literary organizations… maybe you can say that these two below 
are more like ideological patterns or something? From which the literary-proper stands 
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Another writers’ grouping, which dared to assert creative independence in 
literature, were the Ukrainian “fellow travelers,” who were without party affiliation and 
preferred to remain aloof from party life. In seeking to create a literature free from Party 
influence, the “fellow travelers” clashed with Party members, who maintained that they 
alone had the right to determine the direction of proletarian literature. The derisive term, 
“fellow traveler,” made its way into the lexicon of literary criticism after it was used by 
Leon Trotsky in a series of articles entitled “The Non-October Literature,” published in 
Pravda beginning in 1922. In them Trotsky stated that:   
They don’t understand the revolution in its entirety and its communist goal is alien to them. They are all to 
a greater or lesser degree inclined to overlook the worker, focusing their hopes on the peasant. They are no 
artists of the proletarian revolution, but they are its fellow travelers in art.160 
 
Aside from the neo-classicists, who opposed the use of literature for didactic and 
propagandistic purposes, and instead focused on the production of “high art,” the primary 
Ukrainian fellow traveler group, which gathered around the literary journal Life and 
Revolution, was known as Lanka; it included several very talented writers and poets: 
Valeriian Pidmohylny, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Yevhen Pluzhnyk, and others 
who were united in their opposition to Party intrusion into literary affairs. Forced to 
disband in 1929, most of the members of Lanka were executed during the Stalinist terror 
of the 1930s.  
 
Borotbists 
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The Borotbists (fighters), who took their name from their newspaper, Borotba 
(The Struggle) were left-wing members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party who split 
from the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communist Party in 1918 in opposition to Russian 
Bolshevik involvement in the Ukrainian Communist Party. A year later, however, in 
1919, the Borotbists stated their desire to merge with the Ukrainian Bolshevik 
Communist Party. Though the local Communist Party rejected the Borotbists’ overtures, 
they were overruled by the central leadership in Moscow, who recognized the importance 
of securing Borotbist support in their attempts to establish control in Ukraine.161 
Essentially a populist party, the Borotbists held much stronger ties to the Ukrainian 
peasant population than did the Bolsheviks. However, the admission of Borotbists into 
the government did not have an immediate impact on their quest for Ukrainian autonomy 
within a Soviet framework. After 4,000 Borotbists joined the Bolshevik Ukrainian 
Communist Party in 1920, only 118 remained after the party purge in 1921.162 Yet many 
of those who survived would play a significant role in the political and cultural 
development of Ukraine in the 1920s and 30s.163 
The Borotbists were representative of one side of a larger polemic in Soviet 
Ukrainian politics, the debate between centralist versus anti-centralist views. In response 
to the centralizing tendencies of many within the Soviet Ukrainian government who look 
towards Moscow for guidance, the Borotbists and other elements of the government had a 
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vested interest in preserving Ukrainian self-government.164 However, unlike the 
Borotbists, who were latecomers to the Bolshevik party, others, like Mykola Skypnyk, a 
close associate of Lenin, were Bolsheviks during the old regime. Skrypnyk’s philosophy 
was that Bolshevism needed to be Ukrainianized in order to make it more appealing to 
the Ukrainian people.165 Though he is not identified by scholars as a nationalist, 
Skrypnyk, through his various government positions, was a key defender of Ukrainian 
autonomy in the 1920s. Notably, in 1922 Skrypnyk vehemently opposed a proposal by 
Stalin to absorb the non-Russian republics into a unified Russian Soviet socialist state. 
Lenin supported Skrypnyk’s view, proposing that the Soviet republics form a “union of 
equals.” As a result, the 1924 Soviet constitution also carried a provision which afforded 
each republic the right to secession from the union.  
The Bolsheviks were initially inclined to grant concessions to Ukrainian 
nationalists in the political and cultural realms in order to marshal support from the 
countryside. In 1920, the prominent Borotbist Oleksander Shumsky became Commissar 
of Internal Affairs in Ukraine. Shumsky, along with Vasyl’ Blakytnyi166 and Hrihori 
Hryn’ko,167 were among the Borotbists, who affected the path of Ukrainian cultural and 
political development from within the government. The All-Ukrainian Literary 
Committee, under the influence of the Borotbists, published the journal Mystetsvo (Art), 
which debated the direction that new Soviet Ukrainian art, film, and literature should 
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take, and featured the writings of Hnat Mykhailychenko, Pavlo Tychyna, and Mykhail 
Semenko, among other well-known Ukrainian writers. At a conference of the All-
Ukrainian Literary Committee (Vseukrlit) in 1919, the position of the new literary 
intelligentsia was illuminated by Hnat Mykhailychenko, the editor of Mystetstvo, who 
stated that: 
 The old, bourgeois art, especially poetry, was the art of doing nothing , the art of holiday laziness. 
The new proletarian art—this is the art of labor; the poetry of labor, the grandeur of labor, the greatness of 
its achievement, the passion for the process of labor and its comprehensive validity.168 
Although there could be no return to the old beliefs, new ones were not easy to 
create. A concept for a new proletarian literature had been explained it was to but it still 
was not very clear how it should look. Early Soviet attempts to create a formula for 
literature were, therefore, unsuccessful. While the Party had clearly shown its disapproval 
of Proletkult’s interpretation of proletarian literature, it was not yet capable of 
consolidating its authority over literary affairs in Ukraine. The direction that Ukrainian 
literature would take was still able to be freely discussed in the years immediately 
following the revolution. However, as independent, new literary organizations were 
created, the Soviet government became increasingly aware of its inability to control 
literary discourse in Ukraine and reacted with repressive measures. In this early period of 
literary organization, various literary groups sought to create a formula for producing a 
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literature which would be reflective of the new age, competing amongst themselves to 
create an archetype for proletarian literature. 
  
Literary life in post-revolutionary Ukraine manifested itself almost exclusively in 
the form of literary organizations, which were composed of writers who sought “to 
interpret Marxism in many different ways, hoping to distill from it the essence of 
proletarian literature.”169 In the void created by the destruction of the old regime, there 
was a vital need for unambiguous theories on the creation of literature. Imbued with 
revolutionary fervor, literary groups sought such a formula, and although they often 
agreed upon the final goal, they argued over ways in which to achieve it.  
While some writers scorned the idea of individual literary expression, which 
undermined the efforts of the collective to produce a single unified literature, others, 
asserted the need for personal autonomy in the creation of literature. The Ukrainian neo-
classicist170 Mykola Zerov noted that “there is very little literary education, and therefore 
very little possibility of learning from literary models, of testing various styles, of 
emancipating oneself from the strong influence of a master in order to crystallize one’s 
own literary personality.”171 Iurii Mezhenko (Ivaniv), however, a leading Ukrainian 
bibliographer, literary and theatre critic, responded by denouncing the kind of the 
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individual artistic expression espoused by Zerov and Khvylovy.  In an article published in 
Proletar’ska os’vita in 1921, Mezhenko, resorting to literary platitude, which Zerov, 
Khvylovy and other writers despised, proclaimed: “we do not understand or want to 
understand your feeble literary ‘I’ because we are striving toward a spontaneous and 
creative ‘We.’”172  The struggle to assert personal creative freedom amid the prevailing 
tendencies of the time towards collectivism was a significant theme in post-revolutionary 
Ukrainian thought and is exemplified by the relationship between the writers’ 
organizations Pluh and Hart and their dealings with the Party. For Khvylovy, true artistic 
expression resulted from individual genius and was far more valuable to literature than 
the efforts of “a hundred prosvita-types.”173 As Khvylovy wrote in “Kamo Hrideshy,” 
“There can be no doubt that” 
for proletarian creative literature, the Soviet intelligent Zerov, who is armed with the higher 
mathematics of art is—hyperbolically speaking—a million times more useful than a hundred prosvita 
types, who are about as knowledgeable in this art as a pig in orange-growing, who in the seventh year of 
the Revolution have suddenly become more revolutionary than Lenin himself and throw around “red” 
phrases in various Soviet journals over the signature of a “tsia” or an “enko” 174 
 
    
Pluh, Hart, and Party efforts at literary control 
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The literary organization “Pluh,” (Plow) founded in April 1922, and led by the 
fable writer, Serhii Pylypenko, was the first mass literary organization in Ukraine. 
Adopting an artistic and ideological platform, the Pluzhians, as its members were known, 
asserted that their “revolutionary-peasant work should be aimed primarily at organizing 
the consciousness of the peasant masses and the rural intelligentsia in the spirit of 
proletarian revolution.”175 Through depictions of revolutionary peasant life, the 
organization’s members aimed at the creation of “broad pictures” and “universal themes,” 
which would appeal to a wider audience. Asserting the importance of content over form, 
the Pluzhians were openly hostile to any formal experimentation, which they believed led 
to a detachment from real life. 176 They sought simplicity and economy in their artistic 
methods,177 and were concerned with the role of the peasantry in the class struggle: 
The struggle is between the bourgeoisie on one side and the proletariat on the other. Other classes can 
choose between these two; there is no third camp. In this process of class struggle, the peasantry shows its 
lack of unity and is divided between partial support of the bourgeoisie (the ‘kulaks’ and the well-to-do 
peasants) and partial support of the proletariat (poor peasantry, agricultural laborers, and the “middle” 
peasant). The latter groups we regard as revolutionary peasantry… Hence the peasantry is potentially the 
proletariat and its place is on the anti-bourgeois front.178 
  The Pluzhanyn (Plowman), the widely-read journal published by Pluh which 
featured the writings of Andryi Holovko, Petro Panch, and Hryhori Epik among others, 
hoped to realize a new concept of literature which would incorporate on all-inclusive 
theory of literary organization that called for the collaboration of “masses of literary 
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workers, from those with the highest qualifications and the greatest talent down to village 
correspondents and contributors to wall newspapers and circulars.”179  In order to 
facilitate the mass production of peasant writers, Pluh created study groups, forming 
branches throughout Ukraine. The group, with hundreds of devoted members, 
successfully formed a mass literary organization.  However, Pluh’s rapid growth brought 
it into conflict with another literary group that opposed the ideological and esthetic 
platform of the Pluzhians.180 
  In January of 1923, Vasyl Blakytny founded the literary organization known as 
“Hart” (Tempering), which gave its name to its literary journal. It was published monthly 
between 1927 and 1932 in Kharkiv. The aim of the Hartians was to “create a single 
international culture, which would use Ukrainian language as a tool of creation.”181 Hart 
carried on many of the traditions of the Borotbists, including the promotion of Ukrainian 
National-Communism. 182 The organization’s membership, at least for a time, consisted 
of some of the most talented Ukrainian writers of the era, including Mykola Kulish, Pavlo 
Tychyna, and Mykola Khvylovy. Regarded as the founder of Ukrainian proletarian 
literature, Hart played a vital role in the literary politics of the post-revolutionary period. 
In its attempts to extend the discourse on proletarian literature, the organization 
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established affiliate programs in the United States and Canada, which played significant 
roles in the communist movements in those countries.183  
 In the absence of strict Party control over literature in the years immediately 
following the revolution, Pluh and Hart each set out to create a proletarian literature 
which represented the ideals of its founders. However, both organizations also realized 
the necessity of working from within a larger framework dictated by the Communist 
Party. To this end, the members of Pluh and Hart were willing to subordinate literature to 
Party authority as long as they were able to maintain some vestige of control over its 
development. In this way, despite their artistic differences, both Pluh and Hart vied for 
the approval of the Communist Party and willingly submitted their work for evaluation 
by the Party.  
The Thirteenth Party Congress, which was held in May of 1924, clarified the 
Party’s position with the resolution “O Pechati” (On Print Media), asserting that “in the 
field of literature, the Party’s measure would be the workers and rural 
correspondents...while ‘Party-minded literary criticism’ had to become the champion of 
this line.”184 With confirmation of the need to extend Party control over literary activities, 
workers and peasant groups were dispatched to inspect and monitor the activities of Pluh 
and Hart, which entailed maintaining correspondence with village and factory workers, 
creating literary circles, and publishing literature for the masses.  A special commission 
                                                 
183 ibid, 55. 
184 Kornienko, N. “Literary Criticism and Cultural Policy during the New Economic Policy: 1921-1927” in 
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was formed, producing the following report on the activities of Pluh and Hart, which 
offered praise for the two groups, but also contained a caveat: 
The workers’ and peasants’ inspection has in the last days completed its examination of Hart and Pluh. The 
inspection was done with the aim of surveying the material situation and the resources of these 
organizations as well as clarifying the methods of guidance and supervision of these two groups by the 
Party organizations. The following are the results of our investigation: Pluh and Hart are literary 
organizations which provide village and city with suitable Ukrainian literature which is also in accord with 
the Party’s policy of Ukrainization.  
Having taken into account the fact that up to the present day the wide masses of the people are uninformed 
about the activities of Pluh and Hart and that there is, as yet, no clear understanding by Party organizations 
of the work of these bodies, that no constructive criticism exists, and that finally no adequate material 
support has been offered, the inspection commission considers all these matters worthy of general attention. 
Furthermore it is thought necessary to suggest that Pluh’s activities in the villages be conducted with 
caution. The heads of their branches should be Communists…The Central Committee has expressed its 
agreement with the conclusions reached by the administrative and social inspection commission.185 
 
In January of 1925, the All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (VAPP) 
sponsored the “First Union of Proletarian Writers,” which served as a forum for a dispute 
between Pluh and Hart. The All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers (VUAPP), 
an organization which consisted of Russian writers living in Ukraine, and VAPP’s 
Ukrainian representative, proposed a union among Pluh, Hart, and the VUAPP, which 
Hart strongly rejected.  Pluh’s leader, Pylypenko, however, was unopposed to the merger 
and willingly submitted his organization to the control of VAPP. The Hartians intensified 
their attacks on Pluh, as Blakytnyi openly accused Pylypenko of “attempting to ignore the 
principle of representation by National Republics and forming instead an executive 
according to the representation from large industrial centers.”186  
Aside from organizational disputes, Pluh and Hart disagreed on the form the 
proletarian literature should take and on who its intended audience should be. According 
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to its program, Hart’s purpose, like Pluh’s, was to “struggle against bourgeois art” in 
order to attract the proletarian masses to literature. However, the Hartians strictly 
opposed the Pluzhian approach, which maintained that “the task of our time in the realm 
of art is to lower it, to bring it down to Earth, to make it necessary and intelligible to 
all.”187 Hart’s members feared that the idea of “massivism”—the production of literature 
by and for the masses—would lead to a lowering of artistic standards.188 Mykola 
Khvylovy, an outspoken member of Hart, was particularly critical of Pluh and its 
founder, Pylypenko. In the “Author’s Forward” to “Kamo Hriadeshy,” Khvylovy wrote: 
There are two literary, revolutionary organizations: Hart, the union of proletarian writers, and Pluh, the 
union of peasant writers. Many disagreements have recently arisen between these two groupings. Pluh, 
which, by its own admission, is a union of poorly-qualified writers—more correctly, simply a voluntary 
cultural-educational organization that for some reason has pretensions to playing a role in art—is unable to 
accept the existence of Hart and continually attacks it.189  
Khvylovy’s attack on Pluh and Pylypenko led to a split between two opposing factions 
within Hart: the “adherents of the official mass orientation and the supporters of 
Khvylovy, who advocated artistry as the goal of literary activity.”190   
 Addressing the growing rift among literary groups, the Party pronounced its 
“Resolution of the CP(B)U concerning Ukrainian Literary Groupings,” in May of 1925, 
which affirmed that “no single literary organization, including Hart, can claim that it 
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alone represents the Party in the field of literature, or holds a monopoly in applying the 
Party line in this field.”191 The resolution went on to defend Hart against allegations that 
it was a nationalist group hostile to Party interests and praised the organization for 
accomplishing “a great deal in uniting around the Party and Soviet government the most 
active and talented representatives of contemporary Ukrainian literature and poetry.”192 
The Party’s more circumspect praise of Pluh, reflected its concern over the organization’s 
potential to attract the peasant masses. It declared that Pluh’s organizational activity was 
“a great and responsible work which the Party must support,” but that it should be 
confined to those areas “where there are Party organizations to direct (its) work.”193 
While it assessed the organizational work of Pluh and Hart, the more crucial task for the 
Party was to establish itself as the arbiter of literary thought in Ukraine. The Party made 
it clear that the two organizations had, at times, deviated from Party policy in their 
literary endeavors; in response it resolved to form groups of Marxist critics which would 
direct the work of proletarian writers according to Party doctrine. The resolution’s 
pronouncement On Literary Criticism proclaimed the need to organize Marxist criticism 
in such a way as to reveal the “defects and deviations which are present in an equal 
degree among the writers of Hart and other literary groupings…” and “…which occur 
because the Soviet writers do not always understand correctly the Soviet policy…” 194  
Without endorsing any single literary group, the resolution instead reaffirmed the need 
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for a strong Party presence in Ukrainian literary affairs, which could reveal the 
ideological mistakes of its writers.  
As a result of the internal dispute within Hart, Khvylovy and his supporters left 
Hart, with the intention to form a literary group that would forge a new path for 
Ukrainian literature. Rejecting the domineering Russian influence in Ukrainian literature, 
Khvylovy and the circle of writers that formed around him proposed that the direction of 
Ukrainian literature must lead “on no account towards Moscow.”195 On November of 
1925, Khvylovy and others founded VAPLITE, the Free Association of Proletarian 
Writers, whose writers strove to perfect their work by adopting an orientation towards 
western literature.196  
 
VAPLITE 
Organization, program and literary theory  
Unable to survive a serious internal crisis, and with the death of its leader, Ellan 
Blakytny, the literary organization Hart disintegrated at the end of 1925. Its members, 
eager to develop their literary talents, sought new literary organization. Some abandoned 
Blakytny’s “national plus Communist” doctrine and instead looked toward the Party for 
direction, but others “had visions of creating a sophisticated national art and were 
determined to fend off all manifestations of provincialism and crudely utilitarian 
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literature.”197 A group of talented writers led by Mykola Khvylovy formed an 
organization known as the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature (VAPLITE), which 
continued many of the traditions established by Hart. VAPLITE, which existed in 
Kharkiv from 1925-1928, drew into its ranks many of the former members of Pluh and 
Hart. Among the Vaplitians who called for the establishment of closer ties with 
proletarian literary groups at home and abroad and for the promotion of Ukrainian 
literature, were some of the leading writers of the day: Oles Dosvitny, Hryhorii Epik, 
Maik Iohansen, Khvylovy, Mykola Kulish, Ivan Senchenko and Pavlo Tychyna, among 
others.  
 A group of seventeen writers, focused around Khvylovy, met on October 14, 
1925, to undertake the task of structuring the new literary organization.198 Two key points 
were made in the deliberations which served as the basis for the formation of the new 
organization: that it should be represented by multiple schools of literature and that it 
must maintain a free hand in its literary activity. The foundation for VAPLITE’s artistic 
work was defined in its charter, which affirmed that “at the base of its artistic work 
VAPLITE places Marxist ideology and the programmatic postulates of the Communist 
Party, giving its members broad freedom to make use of all artistic and literary forms.”199 
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VAPLITE aspired to be a conglomerate of literary thought and expression unified in a 
single organization. To achieve this, Vaplitians appealed to writers from various literary 
schools, seeking to recruit them into the new literary group. As the name of their 
organization implied, the Vaplitians asserted their autonomy in the management of 
literary affairs, evident by the passage of a resolution at the meeting which declared that:  
The [future] literary organization should unite qualified writers: former members of Hart, Pluh, 
and others. The management of the organization should be in the form of a council elected from 
representatives of various schools and tendencies. The Council should designate one of its members as a 
chairman (or president) and another as secretary. The organization should consist of several literary 
schools, forming one organization with a [common] ideological basis, while retaining wide autonomy as far 
as their literary work is concerned as well as in purely formal matters of publishing, the recruitment of 
young literary forces, and the accomplishment of cultural work outside the organization.200 
 
 In 1926 VAPLITE began a program of literary publication, culminating in the 
production of its eponymous literary journal, which expounded on the literary and 
political views of its members. The new journal was well-received and “stirred wide 
interest among Ukrainian intellectuals, [winning] the group considerable support and 
popularity.”201 Contained in Vaplitian literary model was a profound concern for the 
integrity of artistic expression. The organization sought to elevate the cultural life of 
Ukraine, which according to Khvylovy was too dependent on Russian culture, by 
focusing on quality in literary production rather than quantity. Unlike the multitude of 
generic literary groups, which “could spring up like mushrooms after the rain, without an 
obvious need,”202 VAPLITE was an organization of professional writers, who were 
imbued with a sense of responsibility for their work.  
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The Literary Discussion and Khvylovy 
Pre-dating the formation of VAPLITE, the “Literary Discussion” was a wide-
ranging literary discourse, held in between 1925 and 1928 and, which focused on issues 
concerning the national and cultural identity of Ukrainians.203Central to the discourse 
were the social and political implications of the policy of Ukrainianization, which 
occurred amid rapid industrialization and forced collectivization.204 Khvylovy saw that 
the policy of Ukrainianization also had the effect of appealing to the ignorant masses, the 
lower-class and less-educated elements of Ukrainian society, many of whom assumed the 
mantle of “writer,” using it as a platform to assert their parochial views on literature. 
Initiated by the writings Mykola Khvylovy, who decried the philistine influence on the 
revolution, the Literary Discussion formally began on April 30, 1925, with the 
publication in the literary journal Kultura i Robot (Culture and Daily life) of an article by 
H. Iakovenko entitled “On Critics and Criticism in Literature,” which.205 In it, he 
criticized the prominence of VAPLITE’s “Olympians,”206 who snobbishly rejected the 
literature of “tractors, communes, and the ‘negative behavior of monks.’”207 In 
Iakovlenko’s estimation, Khvylovy’s “Ya…Romantika,” was a story that could only be 
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read by “Philistines and degenerates, for whom the Revolution was an example of acute 
spiritual sadism.”208     
Instigated by the polemical writings of Mykola Khvylovy, one of the key themes 
of the Literary Discussion concerned the development of Ukrainian literature. Though 
they tacitly accepted the official line of the Party, VAPLITE held an independent position 
regarding literary policy and took very seriously its commitment to maintain high artistic 
standards in its work. Khvylovy and others asserted that Ukrainian literature should be 
allowed to develop independently from the Rusocentric literary influence of the Party. 
Khvylovy rejected the Party’s interference in literary affairs in his polemical pamphlets, 
which reflected VAPLITE’s imperative to orient Ukrainian literature in a new direction. 
In “Dumky pro techii,” he wrote:  
“Already we imitate the ‘Pope.’ All these All-Ukrainian Central Committees are quite unnecessary for a 
Ukrainian writer. What is important is not a Central Committee—but literature…From today the slogan is 
not give us quantity—who can give us more?’ but ‘give us quality!’ It is necessary to reinstate the 
destroyed artistic criteria.”209 
 
For Khvylovy the bureaucratization of literature was symptomatic of the pervasive 
influence of Moscow, a city with strong traditions rooted in philistinism.210 In his view, it 
was imperative to create a literature which would satisfy the urban elite; however, the 
elite, which occupied the Russified cities of Ukraine “continued to cower…before the 
Russian master, who still dominated urban centers, who had over the centuries 
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assimilated a Philistine and condescending attitude towards Ukrainian culture.” 211 In the 
unpublished brochure entitled “Ukraine or Little Russia,” Khvylovy wrote: “Today the 
center 
of an all-Union Philistinism is Moscow, in which the proletarian factories, the Comintern, and the 
All-Union Communist Party are like an oasis on the world-scale. While in Ukraine, around the center, one 
can only hear the term “Comrade,” over there they have long ago moved from “Citizen” to “Sir.” Moscow 
has strong traditions which are deeply rooted in Philistinism. Moscow itself (and even the whole of Russia, 
if we exclude Siberia) essentially never saw the October Revolution and its heroic struggle. Russian 
revolutionary democracy is one thing, the thin-bearded Muscovite intellectual quite another.212 
 
Throughout 1926 the Central Committee of the CP(B)U was locked in heated 
debates which focused on issues on taken up during the Literary Discussion, concerning 
the national question, the ideas of Mykola Khvylovy, and cultural development in 
Ukraine.213 At the same time that the Party was vilifying Shumsky for his political errors, 
Khvylovy and others were admonished for their literary deviationism. At the June 1926 
plenary session of the CP(B)U, the same one which produced the “Theses on the Results 
of Ukrainianization,” the prominent Russian Bolshevik, Volodymyr Zatonsky quoted 
from Khvylovy’s “Ia…Romantika” to demonstrate the author’s negative portrayal of the 
Revolution.214 Khvylovy, Shumsky, and the Vaplitian poet Volodymyr Sosiura were 
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accused of “waging a campaign on the national question that could only be described as 
an attack on the Central Committee.”215 Khvylovy’s promotion of a European orientation 
for Ukrainian literature was deemed “useful only for the flag of the Ukrainian petty 
bourgeoisie, which understands the national revival as a bourgeois restoration, and 
considers the orientation toward Europe as an orientation toward Capitalist Europe.”216  
Party Condemnation 
As the Party was in the process of eliminating Shumsky and his ideology, it also 
took steps to discipline VAPLITE and Khvylovy for alleged “anti-proletarian” activities. 
At a November 1926 Politburo meeting, Kaganovich, the General Secretary of the 
CP(B)U, speaking for the other members, demanded that Khvylovy, along with Oles 
Dosvitny and Mykola Ialovy offer a written admission of their guilt. Under intense 
pressure from the Party the three Vaplitians signed an open letter the following month 
conceding their errors: 
We acknowledge that the slogan of orientation toward “psychological Europe,” no matter whether 
past or present, proletarian or bourgeois, coupled with an attempt to sever relations with Russian culture 
and to ignore Moscow (which is the centre of world revolution), as a center of world Philistinism, were 
definite deviations from the proletarian line on internationalism…We fully share the opinion of the Central 
Committee of the CP(B)U about literary groups like the Neoclassicists…We regard, therefore, 
Khvylovy’s…formula of using these groups “psychologically” as erroneous…We recognize our 
ideological and political errors and we openly repudiate them. We do not in any way dissent from the Party 
line and recognize its policy and work, directed by the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, in the field of 
cultural construction as entirely correct.217   
 
Despite admissions of wrong-doing by Khvylovy and others, the Party continued to exert 
pressure on VAPLITE and the Khvlovists. In December of 1926, Volodymyr Koriak, a 
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Ukrainian literary critic and one of the founding members of Hart, gave a lecture in 
Kharkiv, entitled “The Three Musketeers,” in which he attacked Khvylovy, Dosvitny, 
and Ialovy. The publication of the first issue of the literary journal Vaplite was delayed 
and its subsidy was reduced by 666 rubles, as attacks on the group continued to appear in 
newspapers and journals.218 
 In January of 1927, in order to fend off further persecution and save the 
organization, Mykola Kulish, VAPLITE’s president, issued a resolution expelling 
Khvylovy, Ialovy, and Dosvitny from its ranks. As the resolution indicated, Kulish was 
concerned about the future of VAPLITE.219 Though he pointed out that the three 
dissenting writers had renounced their mistakes, he made clear that a conflict still existed 
between them and the rest of the organization, which he feared would negatively impact 
the future work of VAPLITE.220 Unsatisfied with VAPLITE’s attempt to rectify the 
situation internally, the Party responded by admonishing the organization for expelling 
the writers without first receiving Party endorsement for its actions.   
Increasingly, the Party drew links between the Vaplitians and nationalist and 
fascist thought in Ukraine, which it believed was directed from abroad. In its 1927 
resolution concerning Ukrainian literature, the Politburo of the CP(B)U repudiated the 
actions of VAPLITE, and Khvylovy in particular, stating that the Party must work to 
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“combat all counter-revolutionary, bourgeois-liberal, and similar tendencies in literature” 
and that Ukrainian literature should function as a “weapon of the proletariat in its 
direction of the entire Ukrainian cultural development.”221 Increasingly viewed as a 
symbol of opposition, Khvylovy was accused of offering support to the “anti-proletarian” 
Neoclassicists, whose works, for the Party, epitomized harmful bourgeois tendencies in 
literature.  The Party noted that:  
Recently, the bourgeois elements in literature have manifested themselves not only in the 
‘ideological work, designed to satisfy the demands of the growing Ukrainian bourgeoisie’ (Resolution to 
the June plenum of the CP[B]U), but also abroad, among Ukrainian writers of the fascist and nationalist 
camps, where began, in union with fascist Poland, a literary campaign against the Socialist Ukraine...Such 
anti-proletarian tendencies manifested themselves in the works of Ukrainian bourgeois litterateurs of the 
type of the Neoclassicists. They were not met by any opposition; on the contrary, some fellow travelers and 
VAPLITE, headed by Khvylovy and his group, supported them.222 
 
Party denunciations of Khvylovy and his expulsion from VAPLITE, did little to limit his 
association with the organization. The ideological and spiritual leader of the group, 
Khvylovy continued to publish his works in the literary journal, Vaplite, while he 
travelled throughout Austria and Germany in 1927.223 However, it was ultimately the 
continued contact between VAPLITE and dissident writers formerly in its ranks and the 
group’s willingness to publish their works that contributed to the organization’s demise.  
 
Vaplite no.5 
The publication of the fifth issue of Vaplite (1927), which was summarily banned 
by the Party, intensified the criticism against VAPLITE and sealed its fate as an 
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organization. The issue, which featured the writings of Khvylovy, Kulish, Pavlo 
Khristiuk, Tychyna, and others, became the forum for a confrontation between VAPLITE 
and “All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers (VUSPP),” an organization inspired by 
the Party whose aim was to undermine VAPLITE, and with whom VAPLITE had refused 
to form a union.224 Among the criticism leveled at the VUSPP and its representatives, 
Pavlo Khristiuk, a writer unaffiliated with VAPLITE praised the works of Hrihorii Epik, 
while denouncing Volodymyr Sosiura, the former Vaplitian who defected to its rival, the 
VUSPP. Khristiuk believed that among Soviet writers, there existed an unfair obligation 
to portray only the positive aspects of Soviet life, a tendency which was ruining 
literature.225 In the article entitled “Scolding with a Feather”226 Khristiuk wrote that: 
H. Epik touched on the negative phenomena of our reality. And V. Sosiura touched on these 
phenomena longer. It’s true that he approached it differently than did Epik. Epik will thirst for the struggle 
with these phenomena. And Sosiura, with his poetry, produces such an impression that everything is 
already lost, that we don’t have the strength or the competence, that NEP and Philistinism won out over the 
revolution, They demoralized every fighter, destroying all of their hopes and all their efforts at the 
construction of a new life. 227 
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In Khvylovy’s “ Odvertii Lyst do Volodymyra Koryaka” (Open Letter to 
Volodymyr Koriak), the author exposed Koriak’s literary hypocrisy (Koriak was a co-
founder of both Hart and the VUSPP, two organizations  with antithetical views on 
literature ). Khvylovy wrote:         
 Clearly, tediously, and unambiguously. Candidly and pretentiously you try to revise Plekhanovist, that is, 
Marxist esthetic, and yet publicly you purport yourself as an ardent defender of Pylypenkoism…What is 
your formula? What is art? –again, I ask you, as I asked Pylypenko before. But you are silent, and I 
sympathize with you: you will not willingly give your definition because you do not want to appear on the 
pages of our press with the ideologues. 228   
However, the publication in the same issue of Vaplite of the first part to Khvylovy’s 
Valdshnepy (The Woodsnipes) provoked an even stronger reaction.229 In the novella, 
Ahlaya, a Russian-born woman-turned-Ukrainian nationalist, is drawn to Ukraine, where 
the ideals of the revolution are not already hopelessly compromised. The conflict in the 
story is between Ahlaya and Karamazov, a disillusioned Communist.230 Karamazov, and 
those like him, would “not be capable of formulating and creating new ideologies 
because they lack wide individual initiative, and even the appropriate terms, to create a 
program for a new world outlook.”231 Ahlaya, by contrast, symbolizes the future 
generation of intelligentsia, those who possess the qualities necessary to lead. 
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мовчите, і я Вам співчуваю: одверто, з доброї волі, свого визначення ви i не дасте, бо не хочете 
фігурувати на cторінках нашої преси ідеологом.” 
229 Khvylovy, M. “Val’dshepy” Vaplite, No. 5, 1927, 5-69. 
230 Shkandrij, M. “Introduction” 20. 
231 Ibid. 66.  
“Ці Карамазови забули, що вони Карамазенки, що їм бракує доброго пастиря. Вони (часто розумні й 
талановиті) не здібні бути оформителями й творцями нових ідеологій, бо їм бракує широкої 
індивідуальної ініціятиви й навіть відповідних термінів, щоб утворити програму свого нового 
світогляду.” 
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 Andrii Khvylia, one of the chief organizers of the VUSPP, saw in Khyylovy’s  
Valdshnepy an attempt “to show that the Soviet Union is not Soviet, that the dictatorship 
of the proletariat is not real, that the national policy is a sham, that the Ukrainian people 
are backward and will-less, that a great rebirth is yet to come, and finally that the Party 
itself is an organization of hypocrites.”232 Through his heroine, Ahlaya, as “a symbol of 
Ukrainian nationalism and fascism” Khvylovy 
cast a slogan of struggle against our society; he acknowledged that the Revolution…has found herself in a 
blind alley, that the Party has become a group of Pharisees, that there is no hope, and therefore the only 
watchword should be to educate, in the spirit of Ukrainian nationalism, young men who will lead the 
Ukraine to her national regeneration. 233 
Though the novella was unfinished, it was banned by the Party for its romantic depiction 
of Ukrainian nationalism and for its unreserved criticism of the Communist Party.234 
 In the face of Party condemnation, Mykola Kulish, VAPLITE’s President tried in 
vain to save the organization through self-criticism. He admitted that he erred in allowing 
Khvylovy and the other dissident Vaplitians to publish their material in the journal and 
took personal responsibility for the publication of Khristiuk’s article.235 However, Party 
members were unmoved. They may have recalled Kulish’s own article in the fifth issue 
of Vaplite, “Krytyka chy prokurorskyi dopyt? (Criticism or a Procurator’s 
Interrogation?,)236 in which the author wrote “if the VUSPP cannot, through its ideo-
artistic poverty, transcend the limits of yesterday in Ukrainian literature, and, instead, 
tramples around in one place, then it is useless to cover its feeble oath of devotion to 
                                                 
232 Khvylia, A. Vid ukhlu v prirvu (From Deviation to Schism). Kharkiv: vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1928 
quoted in Luckyj, 83. 
233 Ibid. 83 
234 Luckyj,84. 
235 Letter from M. Kulish to Komunist (Ukrainian), January 12, 1928. In Luckyj, 84.  
236 Kulish, M. “Критика чи прокурорський допит?” Vaplite, no.5, 1927.146-57.  
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Soviet power with provocations towards Vaplite in its political address.237 In any case, 
the Party exerted strong pressure on Kulish and the Vaplitians to dissolve their 
organization.   
Dissolution of VAPLITE 
With Khvylovy abroad and amid internal dissent, Kulish shouldered the burden of 
VAPLITE’s struggle against the Party, attempting to keep the organization alive. 
Kulish’s notes, diary entries, and correspondence with Khvylovy are preserved in the 
Liubchenko Papers238 and reveal Kulish’s distress at the prospect of VAPLITE’s 
disintegration.239 On January 12, 1928, the group met to establish its “Protocols of the 
General Meeting of VAPLITE.”240 In a vote taken to decide the fate of the organization, 
fourteen members voted for its “liquidation,” while only two were opposed (Kulish and 
Gromov.)241 The entries dated from around this time in Kulish’s diary exhibit its author’s 
despair over VAPLITE’S fate and over the general state of Soviet literary life. Kulish 
relates: 
January 12, 1928…The meeting of VAPLITE. Resolution to dissolve (in principle). 
13. At Khvylia’s. “A heart-to heart talk.” He said: ‘The fourteen voters were right.’ Draft 
of the letter to the editorial board. Signatures. 
14. Went to Khvyvlia’s to show him the draft of the resolution [about VAPLITE’s 
dissolution]. Change in his mood and ideas. General meeting of VAPLITE at night, in the 
Building of Scholars. Decision to formulate a new collective resolution about dissolution. Election 
of the liquidation committee. 
                                                 
237 Ibid. 147.Kulish, M.: “якщо ВУСПП не може через свою ідейно-художню вбогість вийти замежі 
вчорашнього, в yкраїнській літературі, дня і топчеться на одному місці, то не варто прикривати своє 
безсилля божбою про відданість свою радянській владі й кивати на політичну адресу Вапліте.” 
238 The Liubchenko Papers, are a collection of notes, papers, and correspondence, which were preserved by 
VAPLITE secretary Arkadii Liubchenko, during the mid-1920s. The archive forms the basis for much of 
the scholarship on VAPLITE and the “Literary Discussion,” the last free literary debate held in Ukraine 
between 1925 and 1928.   
239 Luckyj,86. 
240 “Protokol zahalnikh zboriv VAPLITE” in Khvylovy, M. Tvori v p’yatokh tomak, Vol.5. 673. 
241 Ibid. 680. 
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15. A day of despondency and low spirits. 
16. Announcement about dissolution to the People’s Commissariat of Education, the 
Press Section [of the CP(B)U], and to the editorial board of Komunist. 
18. At Skrypnyk’s. Discussion with commentaries. Shorthand. 
20. I have been called to appear before the General-Secretary, Kaganovich. A frank 
conversation.  
 23. Unexpected blast from the Press Section, with an order to call the ‘former ones 
[members of VAPLITE].’ Meeting and waiting in the literary club. 
 29. A dream. First letter to H-ch [Khvylovy]. 
 31. A dream: meeting with H-ch in Oleshky. Dusk. He is going away (across the sand 
and the steppe). We bid each other farewell. I am crying. 
February 1. A dream: Someone carried someone else to the grave pit, which is all ready. They say 
he is dead, but I see how D’s legs bend up. Frightened.242  
Conceding organizational, but not personal defeat, Kulish and the other members of 
VAPLITE issued its final resolution on the 14
th
 of January, 1928. The statement 
reinforced the non-political nature of its work and attested to the organization’s 
commitment to artistic integrity. 
Conceived as a purely literary organization, VAPLITE, offered a high standard of artistic work 
and awareness of the organization and played a significant role in the development of Soviet proletarian 
literature in Ukraine. However, in literary works and literary polemics VAPLITE committed errors, which, 
beyond the will and understanding of the organization, took on a negative political significance. These 
errors by VAPLITE and by its members have been sincerely and repeatedly acknowledged in the decisions 
of the organization, in the pages of the journal, and in the statement of Comrade President Kulish in the 
newspaper “Komunist,” which to the fullest extent unites all members of VAPLITE…Therefore, we, 
members of the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature consider it better to dissolve our organization, in 
order to make it possible for writers who are members of VAPLITE to work more peacefully, in the service 
of Soviet culture, as it is led by our Communist Party243   
Amid the backdrop of a less conscientious policy towards Ukrainianization, and 
with the forced dissolution of VAPLITE, the Party had yet again confirmed its role as 
                                                 
242 Diary entries of M. Kulish, Liubchenko Papers. Cited in Luckyj, 86. 
243 “Rezolutsia zahalnikh zboriv vilnoi akademii proletarsckoi literature VAPLITE” in Khvylovy, M. 
Tvori,Vol.5. 681. “Задумана як суто літературна організація, вапліте дала високий стандарт 
художньої роботи і значну відoграла (sic?) ролю в розвиткові радянської пролетарської літератури 
на Україні. Одначе в процесі літературної роботи й літературної полеміки ВАПЛITE допустилася 
помилок, що помимо волі і усвідомлення організації набрали політичного неґативного значiння. Ці 
помилки ВАПЛITE та окремі члени цілком щиро визнали неоднократно в постановах організації на 
сторінках журналу «Вапліте» та заяві президента тов. М. Куліша надрукованої в газеті «Комуніст» 
до якої повній мірі приєднуються всі члени ВАПЛITE… Через це ми, члени Вільної Академії 
Пролетарської Літератури, вважаємо за краще розпустити свою організацію, щоб дати можливість 
письменникам, членам ВАПЛIТЕ, спокійніше працювати на користь радянської культури, якою 
керує наша комуністична партія.” 
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arbiter of literary affairs in Soviet Ukraine. However, many prominent Ukrainian patriots 
had come forward in the spheres of politics and literature to advocate for a greater 
measure of autonomy in the face Soviet repression. Oleksander Shumsky’s contention 
that Ukraine should be represented politically by Ukrainians and Mykola Kvhylovy’s 
advocacy for a path for Ukrainian literature away from Moscow were, for the Party, 
symptomatic of harmful political ideas, which they branded as “Shumskyism” and 
“Khvlyovism,” respectively. 
 Khvylovy, in particular, presented a significant threat to the Party because of his 
talent and popularity, and for his views on Ukrainian literature. As such, he was silenced: 
his work was obstructed by the Party and he was harassed into suicide in 1933. 
Khvylovy’s remarkable literary output in the mid to late 1920s demonstrated not only his 
deep concern for the development of Ukrainian culture, but also a profound 
disillusionment by the disparity between the Revolution’s stated aims and the reality it 
manifested. His sloganeering (“Europe,” and “On no account towards Moscow”) and 
neologisms (“prosvita,244” “khokhlandia”245) reflected a call for liberation from Ukraine’s 
populist past. Khvylovy’s novellas and short stories, demonstrate the extent to which the 
individual must debase himself in order to become a part of the new Socialist reality. As 
                                                 
244 Prosvita, “enlightenment,” in Ukrainian, generally refers to groups of societies that formed in Ukraine 
in the late 19
th
 century to promote cultural awareness. However, in this context Khvylovy uses the word 
“prosvita” to refer to those with a parochial word view, who attempt to impose their ignorance on all, 
namely, for Khvylovy, Pluh’s Pylypenko.   
245 Khokhlandia refers to the general state of those who are Khokhli (pejorative term given to Ukrainians 
by Russian, meaning something like “hick”), by which Khvylovy means those Ukrainians who behave 
obsequiously and slavishly toward Russia and its elite. The term refers to a trend in Ukrainian culture, 
(which may possibly have its origins in the late 18
th
 century when Catherine the Great began to assimilate 
the Cossack elite into the Russian Empire by assigning them government posts) whereby Ukrainians, for 
various reasons, attempted to insinuate themselves into Russian-dominated society by abandoning their 
Ukrainian-ness.    
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Khvylovy noted, in spite of its progressive humanist ideals Socialism was, in reality, 
being implemented by philistines,246who were valued for their capacity to commit 
violence in the name of ideology. 
 
Khvylovy and Ukrainian Modernism 
Mykola Khvylovy is “almost certainly the one writer who like a lightning rod 
attracted, focused, and transmitted the enormous energies of his day—and the energies 
and powers of interpretation of succeeding generations.”247 No other writer of the era 
made as significant an impact on the direction of Ukrainian cultural, political, and literary 
thought as did Khvylovy. His contribution to the Ukrainian literary cannon, his polemical 
pamphlets and fictional writings, are significant not only for what they reveal about the 
state of literary activity in Soviet Ukraine, but also because they are representative of a 
short-lived Ukrainian literary renaissance, which, led by Khvylovy, concerned itself with 
the task of establishing a Ukrainian literature that looked not towards Moscow for its 
literary models, but to the West. The key ideas put forth by Khvylovy in his polemical 
pamphlets: prosvita, art, Asiatic renaissance, and Europe248 indicate a psychological 
orientation towards Europe rather than Russia, and a rejection of provincialism and 
populism. These ideas are symbolic of a Ukrainian Modernist ideology, which is 
                                                 
246 See discussion of Dr. Tahabat and the “degenerate” in the section on Khvylovy’s “Ya…Romantika” in 
the third part of the paper. 
247 Grabowicz, George G. "Symbolic Autobiography in the Prose of Mykola Khvyl'ovyi (some Preliminary 
Observations)." Harvard Ukrainian Studies 22 (1998): 165. 
248 As identified by M. Shkandrij in “Intro.” 8-9 
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prominently characterized by the need to rebel against Ukraine’s populist past.249  By 
examining the major themes in Khvylovy’s polemical pamphlets and in his prose, we are 
able to better understand the author’s vision for a new Ukrainian literature. In this chapter 
I would like first to attempt to establish, for the purposes of this paper, a simplified 
definition of Ukrainian Modernism and then briefly look at the origins of modernism in 
Ukrainian literature. Next, I will examine aspects of Khvylovy’s modernist ideology, 
which are present in his polemical writings in in his prose. While it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to offer a comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian modernism, it is necessary to 
establish a basic framework through which we can orient Khvylovy’s literary style. 
Modernism’s place in Ukrainian literature has been hotly debated among scholars, who 
have yet to provide an authoritative definition for the movement. However, many agree 
that some of the key features of modernism are discernable in Khvylovy’s polemical 
pamphlets and in his prose. Khvylovy’s modernist ideology was forged by the creative 
forces unleashed by the Ukrainian revolution.  
 “Poorly defined” and “inaccurately conceived,”250 Modernism in Ukrainian 
literature has provoked debates among literary scholars who have called for a clearer and 
less restrictive definition of the term. In his polemical contribution to the debate, 
“Exorcising Ukrainian Modernity,” George Grabowicz asserted that Ukrainian 
Modernism, “if the notion is to be meaningful …must be understood as a concept 
defining both a period and a style, with a flexible, rather than schematic sense of a system 
                                                 
249 Tarnawsky, M. "Modernism in Ukrainian Prose." Harvard Ukrainian Studies 15.3/4 (1991). 266. 
250 Tarnawsky, M. "Modernism in Ukrainian Prose." Harvard Ukrainian Studies 15.3/4 (1991). 266. 
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of themes, and, above all, values and artistic devices and stances…”251 Literary scholars 
have put forth compelling arguments, which while demonstrating the problematic nature 
of establishing an a definition for Ukrainian Modernism, have contributed greatly to our 
understanding of the Modernist movement in Ukrainian literature.252 While they have 
disagreed over which Ukrainian writers might be classified as Modernists, a basic 
consensus exists in terms of the way in which many scholars have come to view 
Ukrainian Modernism. For the purposes of this paper, Ukrainian Modernism may be 
loosely defined as an ideology, both a polemic and a poetics, characterized by its 
opposition to populism and its concern for the inviolability of individual artistic 
expression, that “transcends its historical time and cultural setting,”253 linking many of 
the writers of the 1920s to their pre-revolutionary literary antecedents.  The traditional 
division of Ukrainian literature into pre and post-revolutionary eras often obscures the 
literary similarities which exist between the two generations.254 Scholars who have 
sought a broader definition for Ukrainian Modernism have noted the ideological and 
stylistic similarities between some of the Ukrainian writers of the 1920s and the early 
Modernist writers at the turn of the century. Among the early Ukrainian Modernist 
writers there was a deep concern for artistic integrity and individual freedom in literary 
expression and opposition to the parochial views of populist litterateurs. As Tarnawsky 
                                                 
251 Grabowicz, G. "Commentary: Exorcising Ukrainian Modernism." Harvard Ukrainian Studies 15.3/4 
(1991): 281. 
252 See the Harvard Ukrainian Studies series on Modernism in Ukrainian Literature.  Harvard Ukrainian 
Studies 15(3-4) December 1991. See also, “Modernism’s National Narrative,” in Shkandrij, M. Russia and 
Ukraine 197-212. 
253 Grabowicz, G. "Commentary: Exorcising Ukrainian Modernism." 273-83.276. 
254 Tarnawsky, M. "Modernism in Ukrainian Prose." 266. 
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affirms, “the driving idea of Ukrainian Modernism is the rejection of populism and 
village realism.”255 
The early Ukrainian Modernist movement in literature began in the pre-
revolutionary era, with writers who were associated with the literary organizations, 
“Ukrainska Khata” (Ukrainian House) and “Moloda Muza” (Young Muse). Moloda 
Muza, formed in 1906, was an informal group of writers, based in Lviv, who sought 
“freedom and liberty in content and form.” Among the traits which characterized the 
group as a whole were a penchant for the aesthetic above the utilitarian in life, an 
opposition to populism, and a focus on the intelligentsia. The editors of the group’s 
organ, the journal Svit,(World) printed a letter to its readership, affirming its commitment 
to use literature as a means to accentuate beauty and goodness in life:  
“We come to you during these trying days of wide social and political activity and we point to the 
path of Goodness and Beauty, often forgotten in times of struggle and yet so longingly awaited. This path 
we have given the name Svit… We will do everything in our power to bring forth Svit as best as possible. 
The names of our contributors, their respect for art—let these speak today to our honorable comrades and 
compatriots. We extend warm and sincere encouragement to such a good and necessary affair, we add our 
enthusiasm and our love - the rest is in your hands, respected public.256 
The journal published the writings of the pioneering Ukrainian Modernist writer, 
Olha Kobylianska, whose works depicted cultured female protagonists oppressed by a 
philistine and provincial society. For Koblianska, feminism signified the attainment of 
personal autonomy, a “painful, conscious, and long-drawn-out process;257her works 
“emphasized professionalism and condemned dilettantism, amateurishness, and lack of 
                                                 
255 Tarnawsky,”Modernism in Ukrainian Prose” 10. 
256 Svit, no. 1 (24 February 1906), p. 1  cited in Struk, Danylo Husar. "The Journal Svit: A Barometer of 
Modernism." Harvard Ukrainian Studies 15.3/4 (1991): 248. 
257 Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Martha. Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 
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literary technique.”258  The renowned Ukrainian author, Lesia Ukrainka, wrote to 
Kobylianska, her contemporary and friend: “You are an artist. In our public this is not 
valued very highly, but I love it above all. Es lebe die Kunst!”259 However, critics such as 
Serhii Iefremov, a literary scholar from Eastern Ukraine and an advocate of populism in 
literature,260 considered Kobylianska to be “elitist” and criticized her works for lacking in 
social responsibility and for propagating a concept of beauty that bordered on 
pornography: 
 The farthest development of the symbolist scheme, and the essence of the discovery made by the young 
generation, the last word, so to speak, of our symbolism consists of the fact that the cult of love turns into 
the cult of…the naked body—of course, the female naked body predominantly if not exclusively. Yet that 
is exactly, if you will, what was bound to happen: if the whole meaning of life rests only on beauty and 
physical love, then sooner or later that beauty and love will undoubtedly focus on one point—straight 
sensuality and straight unadulterated pornography.261 
 
Mykyta Shapoval, an political and civic leader from Eastern Ukraine, who held 
positions in three separate Ukrainian governments between 1917 and 1919, helped found 
the journal Khata—“a vehicle for Ukrainian Modernism.”262 He saw in Olga 
Kobylianska’s pioneering work, Tsarivna,263 “a model for the attainment of personal 
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autonomy.”264 Like Kobylianska, who “experienced a large influence from Nietzsche, 
with his ultra-individualistic philosophy,”265 Shapoval and the Khatians asserted 
Nietzschean ideals of freedom for the individual in their own literature. Thus, the 
writings of Friedrich Nietzsche provided the ideological basis for the rebelliousness of 
the works of the early Ukrainian Modernists. For Shapoval, their works were to be 
evaluated on the basis of their esthetic value and their expression of the national idea. 
Under his editorship the literary journal, Ukrainska Khata, appeared in Kiev between 
1909 and 1914 and featured the works of Ukrainian Modernists, along with translations 
of Charles Baudelaire,266 Heinrich Mann,267 and others. The journal served as a major 
forum for young, nationally-conscious Ukrainians inspired by the 1905 revolution, who 
formed the basis for a new Ukrainian national liberation ideology and national/cultural 
world view. Many early Ukrainian Modernists “believed in a European orientation for 
Ukrainian culture, had visions of creating a sophisticated national art, and were 
determined to fend off all manifestations of provincialism and crudely utilitarian 
literature.”268 Ukrainian Modernism legitimized art as a free, individual pursuit; not 
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beholden to any edifying or enlightening program, it was to be measured by European, 
and not just simply nativist, standards. 269 
The works of the pre-Revolutionary Modernist writers in Ukraine share basic 
ideological similarities with the writings of Mykola Khvylovy. Although scholarship 
(particularly English-language scholarship) on the topic is rather limited, some 
outstanding contemporary Ukrainian literary scholars have expounded upon key 
similarities between the ideas of the pre-Revolutionary Ukrainian Modernists and those 
of Khvylovy. Among the most illuminating is Oleh Ilnytzkj’s, article entitled “The 
Modernist Ideology and Mykola Khvylovy,” which makes a strong case for the validity 
of such a comparison. By examining Khvylovy’s early letters to Mykola Zerov and 
Khvylovy’s theretofore-unpublished pamphlet “Ukraina chy Malorosia,” Ilnytzkj 
concluded that Khvylovy “had a close affinity for certain aspects of the Modernist 
ideology.”270 The thrust of Ilnytzkj’s argument rests on two key points of similarity 
between Khvylovy and his ideological predecessors: the necessity of a European 
orientation for Ukrainian literature and the obligation to struggle against philistinism.271  
Khvylovy and pre-Revolutionary Ukrainian Modernism 
In his polemical pamphlets Khvylovy confronted two fundamental issues, the 
need to direct a European orientation for Ukrainian literature and an imperative to break 
with Ukraine’s nativist past, ideas which were also of central importance to the pre-
Revolutionary Modernists. Implicit in this dichotomy (European orientation and rejection 
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of populism) are a host of other ideas, including, prominently, the need to preserve the 
sanctity of art as an individual pursuit. Khvylovy was completely opposed to the concept 
that art must necessarily be lowered in order to make it more accessible to the common 
man. (As we have seen in the previous chapters, Khvylovy ridiculed the “enko”s272 for 
just this idea.) In his own works, Khvylovy made no concessions to “the ignoramus, the 
plodding dullard, or to the prejudiced member of the dominant Russified city culture who 
viewed all things Ukrainian with condescension or contempt.”273  However, this tendency 
did not mean that art should be divorced from the national idea. On the contrary, the 
freedom to explore and to create various literary models precisely served the national 
interest. As the Ukrainian poet Bohdan Ihor Antonych stated, “Art—in and of itself—is a 
social value; a nation is obviously a society, therefore art is by definition also a national 
value.”274  
Khvylovy’s critics were the first to draw comparisons between him and the pre-
Revolutionary Modernists. The literary scholar and critic Oleksandr Doroshkevych wrote 
in 1925 that Khvylovy was “an epigone of modernistic-aesthetic Europe.”275 However, 
for Khvylovy, the fundamental problem concerned how to create art in a culturally-
backward country and in the absence of non-Russian literary models. In “Kulturnii 
Epigonism” (Cultural Epigonism) Khvylovy wrote: 
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We are faced with this fundamental and unexplained dilemma: Are we going to approach our 
national art as fulfilling a service (in the given instance—serving the proletariat) and as forever 
subordinate, forever a reserve for those of the world’s arts that have attained a high level of development?  
Or on the contrary, while retaining the service role shall we find it necessary to raise its artistic 
level to that of the world masterpieces? 276 
Comparisons between Khvylovy’s VAPLITE and the Khataists by their critics concerned 
the European orientation that the two groups espoused for Ukrainian literature. As 
Ilnytzkj pointed out, Khvylovy praised Mykhailo Iatskiv, the “greatest of all the Moloda 
Muza writers,” for playing an outspoken role in the struggle against philistinism.277 
Khvylovy, for whom Modernism equated to an explicit rejection of philistinism, 
embraced the comparisons drawn between the Vaplitians and the Khataists by their 
critics: “In other words, if we are ‘khatiany,’ than those who are not with us are in the 
clutches of provincialism…Because, after all, what is ‘khatianstvo,’? Did it not have a 




The first cycle of Khvylovy’s polemical pamphlets, entitled “Quo Vadis,” 
described several ideas which are crucial to understanding Khvylovy’s literary ideology. 
                                                 
276 Khvylovy, M. “Kulturnii Epigonism” Tvori v p’yatokh tomakh. Vol.2 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 
176. 
“Стоїть така основна й нез’ясована дилема: —Чи будемо ми розглядати своє національне 
мистецтво, як служебне (в даному разі воно служить пролетаріятові) і як вічно — підсобне, вічно — 
резервне, до тих світових мистецтв, які досягли високого розквіту? Чи, навпаки, залишивши за ним 
ту ж саму служебну ролю, найдемо за потрібне підіймати його художній рівень на рівень світових 
шедеврів?” 
277 Ilnytzkj, 259. 
278Khvylovy, M. “Ukriana chy Malorosia” Tvori. Vol.2 Кiev: Vydanstvo khudozhnii literaturi 
“Dnipro,”1990, pp.576-621. This quote is also cited in Ilnytsky, 259. 
“Іншими словами, коли ми «хатяни», то той, хто не з нами, обов’язково попадає в лабети 
просвітянства… Бо що таке «хатянство»? Чи не було воно потенціальним західництвом? Отже, в 
цьому сенсі ми дійсно вбачаємо в ньому свого предка. 
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Prosvita, art, the Asiatic Renaissance, and Europe, as Myroslav Shkandrij has noted, are 
four inter-related ideas which are central in Khvylovy’s pamphlets. A major failing of the 
Ukrainianization program, as Khvylovy recognized, was that it afforded the least 
qualified and most philistine writers of the era a position of literary prominence. To 
Khvylovy these writers were imposters, “hacks,” who stood for the degradation of art and 
its subordination to Soviet authority. What was needed, then, was a renaissance in 
Ukrainian literature, which rejected provinciality and embraced the European literary 
tradition. Obstructing the progress of Ukrainian literature were the prosvita types, who, 
unable to produce anything of literary merit, were compelled to substitute ideological 
debate for artistic ability.279 Prosvita originally refers to pre-Revolutionary cultural 
groups which assumed a populist character and operated primarily in the Ukrainian 
villages; in his polemical pamphlets, Khvylovy uses the term to connote provinciality and 
primitiveness.   In On ‘Satan in a Barrel’ or On Graphomaniacs, Speculators, and other 
Prosvita-Types (A First Letter to Literary Youth),” the first of Khvylovy’s pamphlets in 
“Quo Vadis,” the author opened by quoting Oswald Spengler:280  
“I elevate Bach and Mozart to inaccessible heights, but it does not follow from this that thousands 
of scribes and philosophers who inhabit our large cities should be given the title of artist and thinker.”281 
Khvylovy’s message is that the term “artist” has been appropriated by retrograde 
elements in society who denigrate art through their attempts lower its standards. Only by 
                                                 
279 Shkandrij, “Introduction.”6-9. 
280 Oswald Spengler was a German historian and writer best known for his book The Decline of the West. 
Spengler had a huge impact on intellectual discourse throughout Europe in the 1920s and his ideas and 
works were influential to Khvylovy.  
281 Shkandrj, “Introduction.” 9 
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breaking from its backward past, with its traditions of populism and ethnographism, can 
Ukrainian literature aspire to serve the interests of the intelligentsia.282 
In “On Copernicus of Frauenburg or The ABC of the Asiatic Renaissance in Art 
(a Second Letter to Literary Youth” Khvylovy wrote of the potentially harmful influence 
of prosvita in Ukrainian literary society. He addressed the younger generation of 
Ukrainian writers, imploring them to “take a critical view of those ‘inscribed truths,’ 
which ‘enko’ preaches.”283 Art, in Khvylovy’s mind, “was to be one of the highest 
vocations: it was not understood as the propagation of convenient political slogans, but as 
the playful composition of profound ideas and complex imagery.”284 For Khvylovy, art 
was the product of genius: “one must be born an artist.”285 By contrast, the prosvita artist 
was “…the philistine, the man-in-the-street who, keeping pace with the development of 
the victorious class, succeeds in giving society a useful work.”286 The prosvita artist, 
then, is no artist at all: “Because an artist who ‘keeps pace with the victorious class’ 
ceases to be an artist.”287  Khvylovy’s definition of art echoed the pre-Revolutionary 
                                                 
282 Ibid. 9. 
283 Khvylovy, M. “Pro Kopernika z Frauenbyrg, abo Abetka Aziatskoho Renesancy v Mistetsvi” Tvori v 
p’yatokh tomakh. Vol. 4 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 86.  
“Гадаємо також, що наша абетка збентежить «молоду» молодь, і вона поставиться критично до тих 
привабливих «прописних істин», які проповідує «енко». 
284 Shkandrij, “Introduction” 10. 
285 Khvylovy, M. “Pro Kopernika z Frauenbyrg, abo Abetka Aziatskoho Renesancy v Mistetsvi” Tvori v 
p’yatokh tomakh. Vol. 4 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 94. “— Мистцем треба народитись” 
286 Ibid. 96.  
“Але йдемо далі. Йдемо до просвітянського визначення мистця. — «Я називаю (каже «енко») 
художником того міщанина «обивателя», який в рівні з ходою розвитку кляси-переможниці зумів 
дати суспільству корисний твір”. 
287 Ibid.96.  
“Бо мистець, який йде «врівні з ходом розвитку кляси», перестає бути мистцем.” 
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Ukrainian Modernists—they also “pointed to a path of goodness and beauty”: “What is 
‘art in general…’” Khyvylovy wrote, 
To answer this question, you do not have to be a theoretician. 
Art in general is an arch-specific branch of human activity, which attempts to satisfy one of the 
needs of the human ‘spirit,’ namely love of the beautiful.288 
 
Khvylovy’s conception of art is closely related to another of his major symbols, 
the “Asiatic Renaissance.” Khvylovy believed that the Revolution would lead to a 
cultural and political revival in which Ukrainian literature would play a messianic role.  
“The powerful Asiatic Renaissance in art is approaching,” Khvylovy wrote, 
 and its forerunners are we, the ‘Olympians.’ Just as Petrarch, Michelangelo, Raphael, etc., in their 
time from a tiny corner of Italy set Europe ablaze with the fire of the Renaissance, in the same way the new 
artists from the once oppressed Asiatic countries, the new artist communards who are travelling with us 
will climb the peak of Mount Helicon and place there the lamp of the Renaissance, and, under the distant 
rumble of fighting on the barricades, it will cast the light of its blazing purple-blue pentangle over the dark 
European night.289  
 
Khvylovy envisioned the “Asiatic Renaissance” as a battle which would usher in a great 
spiritual awakening among the Asian countries. It represented a struggle “against the old 
psyche” and was characterized by what Khyvylovy’s called Romantic vitaism.  Romantic 
vitaism (life) was to be the “art of the first period of the Asiatic renaissance. From the 
                                                 
288 Ibid. 87. 
 — «Мистецтво взагалі» — то архи-специфічна галузь людської діяльности, що намагається 
задовольнити одну із потреб «духу» людини, саме любов до прекрасного. 
289 Ibid. 98. 
“Отже, гряде могутній азіятський ренесанс у мистецтві, і його предтечами є ми, «олімпійці». Як в 
свій час Петрарка, Мікель-Анджело, Рафаель і т. д. з італійського закутказапалили Европу огнем 
відродження, так нові мистці, з колись пригноблених азіятських країн, нові мистці-комунари,що 
йдуть за нами, зійдуть на гору Гелікон, поставлять там світильник Ренесансу, і він, під дальній гул 
барикадних боїв, спалахне багряно-голубим п’ятикутником над темною, європейською ніччю.” 
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Ukraine it must spread to all parts of the world and there play not a domestic role, but a 
universally human one.”290 Romantic vitalism As Khvylovy wrote in “Quo Vadis,” 
Speaking of the Asiatic Renaissance, we mean the future unheard-of flowering of art among such nations as 
China, India, and so forth. We set it as a great spiritual reawakening of the backward Asian countries. It has 
to appear, this Asiatic Renaissance, because the idea of Communism stalks like a spectre not so much over 
Europe as over Asia; because Asia, realizing that only Communism will liberate it from economic slavery, 
will utilize art as a factor in the battle…The Asiatic Renaissance is the culminating point of the transition 
epoch.291 
 
The fourth symbol in Khvylovy’s “Quo Vadis,” “Europe,” is the force “which 
thrusts humanity forward, out of prosvita and on to the highway of progress.”292 Europe, 
as a “psychological category,” represents an orientation away from the provinciality of 
Ukraine’s past and towards a European literary tradition. For Khvylovy,  
“Europe is the experience of many ages. It is not the Europe that Spengler announced was ‘in decline,’ not 
the one that is rotting and which we despise. It is the Europe of a grandiose civilization, the Europe of 
Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, and Marx, and so forth. It is the Europe that the first phalanxes of the 
Asiatic renaissance cannot do without.”293 
 
                                                 
290 Ibid. 104. 
“Це мистецтво першого періоду азіятського ренесансу. З України воно мусить перекинутися у всі 
частини світу й відограти там не домашню ролю, а загальнолюдську.” 
291 Ibid. 100. 
 “— Говорячи про азіятський ренесанс, ми маємо на увазі майбутній нечуваний розквіт мистецтва в 
таких народів,як Китай, Індія і т. д. Ми розуміємо його, як велике духовне відродження азіятськи-
відсталих країн. Він мусить прийти, цей азіятський ренесанс, бо ідеї комунізму бродять примарою 
не стільки по Европі, скільки по Азії, бо Азія, розуміючи, що тільки комунізм звільнить її від 
економічного рабства, використає мистецтво як бойовий чинник. Отже, гряде новий Рамаян. 
Азіятський ренесанс — це кульмінаційна точка епохи переходового періоду.” 
292 Khvylovy, M. “Pro Demagogichnu Vodichku, abo Spavzhnya Adresa Ukrainskoi Voronshini, Vilna 
Konkorentsia, VUAN, i.t.d (Tretii list do literaturni molodi)”(On Waters of Demagogy or The Real 
Address of Ukrainian Voronskyism, Free Competition, Vuann, etc. Third Letter to the Literary Youth) 
Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.4 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 130.  
“ Ми розуміємо Европу теж, як психологічну категорію, яка виганяє лю дськість із просвіти на 
великий тракт прогресу” 
293 Ibid. 110.  
“Що ж таке Европа? Европа — це досвід багатьох віків. Це не та Европа,що її Шпенглер оголосив 
«на закаті», не та, що гниє, до якої вся наша ненависть. Це — Европа грандіозної цивілізації, Европа 
— Ґете, Дарвіна, Байрона, Ньютона, Маркса, і т. д., і т. п. Це та Европа, без якої не обійдуться перші 
фаланги азіятського ренесансу. 
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Through the Ukrainian Neoclassicist writer, Mykola Zerov, Khvyovy formed the image 
of a European-oriented Ukrainian litterateur: “We have to use the Zerovs,” Khvylovy 
wrote, “not only for their technical skills, but also in their psychological dimension…the 
fact that they are so intently ‘against the current’ in translating the Romans, gives us the 
right to view them as real Europeans.”294  An orientation towards Europe and away from 
Russia is the crux of Khvylovy’s Modernist ideology. Those involved in the struggle 
against philistinism in the cultural and literary sphere are harbingers of a new epoch in 
Ukrainian literature. “We are not feeble epigones,” Khvylovy affirmed, “We are 
courageous pioneers in the “brilliant world—Communism.” 295  “And so,” Khvylovy 







“Коли ти революціонер — ти не раз розколеш своє «я».”297 
“When you are a Revolutionary, more than once does your “I” split. 
 
 
                                                 
294 Khvylovy, M. “Pro Demagogichnu Vodichku, abo Spavzhnya Adresa Ukrainskoi Voronshini, Vilna 
Konkorentsia, VUAN, i.t.d (Tretii list do literaturni molodi)”(On Waters of Demagogy or The Real 
Address of Ukrainian Voronskyism, Free Competition, Vuann, etc.) Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.4 
Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 130. 
“Отже, зерових ми мусимо використати не тільки по лінії техніки, але й у напрямку психології…той 
факт, що вони так пильно «проти течії» перекладають римлян, дає нам право вбачати в них 
справжніх європейців.” 
295 Ibid. 130. 
“Ми не безсилі епігони, ми відважні піонери «в яскравий світ —комунізм.” 
296 Ibid. 111.  
“Що ж тоді: — Европа чи просвіта? — Для мистецтва — тільки — Европа.” 
297 Khvylovy, M. “Pro Kopernika z Frauenbyrg, abo Abetka Aziatskoho Renesancy v Mistetsvi” Tvori v 
p’yatokh tomakh. Vol. 4 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 104. 
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Mykola Khvylovy’s “Ia (Romantika),” is perhaps his one prose work which best 
describes the author’s Modernist dilemma. In apocalyptic terms, Khvylovy conveys the 
profound sense of personal crisis that is brought about by the painful reality of the 
Revolutionary era. The result of this personal crisis is a fracturing of the ego, whereby the 
“I” is represented by its constituent parts. The opposition between these facets of the 
protagonist’s ego, the psychopathic discourse, provides the tension through which the 
narrative progresses. As Solomea Pavlychko has identified Khvylovy himself 
experienced such an ideological crisis, which “pushed him to the brink of a permanent 
mental breakdown. Neurasthenia, emotional crisis, mental illness, abnormality, hysteria - 
these words define the leitmotifs of his prose.”298 Through an analysis of the story’s main 
characters and their interactions, we are able to better discern the nature of the 
protagonist’s psychological rupture and its consequences. The protagonist’s inner drama 
plays out against the background of his external reality. In this way, the story’s self-
reflexive character allows it to “gain external objectivity and social relevance,” by 
enacting “the inner schisms inherent in (Khvylovy’s) era.”299 
As the story opens, the reader is confronted with two primary images, the mother 
and the “intangible commune” to which she is linked. For Khvylovy, the “distant” or 
                                                 
298 Pavlychko, S. Diskors Modernizmu v Ukrainski Literaturi: Monografia. Kiev: Lebid, 1999. 269. 
“Микола Хвильовий як письменник і особистість упродовж 20-х років пережив світоглядну кризу, 
яка поставила його на межу постійного душевного зриву. Неврастенія, душевна криза, психічна 
хвороба, ненормальність, істерія — цими словами визначаються лейтмотиви його прози.” 
299 Ferguson, Dolly. “Lyricism and the Internal Landscape in the Early Creative Prose of Mykola 
Khvyl’ovyi” Canadian Slavonic Papers: An Inter-disciplinary Quarterly devoted to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe 18.4 (1976). 430. 
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“intangible” (literally the “commune beyond the mountains”300) represents the ideal 
vision of the communist future. The Mother’s connection to the distant commune, her 
“innocence, silent sorrow, and limitless kindness,”301 immediately cast her in a 
martyrological light. The Mother here can be seen as a projection of the protagonist’s 
psyche, and she has some very fundamental associations: she symbolizes righteousness, 
and goodness, sovereignty, and humanity. The protagonist’s material world, by contrast, 
is lawless and brutal; survival in this world requires the abnegation of those ideals which 
the Mother represents. As the protagonist comes under the influence of the ideas 
associated with the image of the Mother, his irrepressible and painful reality becomes 
manifest: 
 “And both my impossible suffering and my unbearable torture grow warm in the light of fanaticism before 
this wonderful picture of sorrow.”302 
 
The Mother plays a revelatory role in the story through her connection to the 
distant commune and with her prophetic warnings. Her message is foreboding: she warns 
her son, the protagonist, that he is losing his humanity. “Beware” the Mother pleads, 
“…the mint withers in sorrow…A storm is approaching.”303 The image of the mint here 
is important: not only does it suggest a connection to purity, virtue, and humanity; it also 
                                                 
300 “загірна комуна” 
301 Khvylovy, M. “Ia Romantika” Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.2 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 33.  
“Моя мати — наївність, тиха жура і добрість безмежна. (Це я добре пам’ятаю!).  
302 Ibid.33. 
“І мій неможливий біль, і моя незносна мука теплію ть у лямпаді фанатизму перед цим прекрасним 
печальним образом.” 
303 Ibid. 34. 
“— Тривога! — Мати каже, що вона поливала сьогодні м ’яту, і м’ята вмирає в тузі. М ати каже: 
«Надходить гроза!» І я бачу: в її очах стоять дві хрустальні росинки. 
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has a certain sensorial significance in its connection to the Mother. When the protagonist 
arrives at his mother’s home, the yard also smells of mint; visual and olfactory, and later 
in the story, extra-sensory representations of mint signify its importance as a symbol. The 
image of the mint and its accompanying associations are ephemeral, however. Similarly, 
the image of the Mother also emerges when the protagonist doubts the righteousness of 
his revolutionary obligations. But in the presence of Dr. Tahabat and the degenerate, “in 
the lamp of Revolutionary fanaticism,” the Mother withdraws and “waits, rigid, in the 
darkness.”304 Unable to distinguish between reality and fantasy, the protagonist tries to 
convince himself that his Mother, in fact, does not exist:  
“And then, alarmed, I assured myself that this was false, that no such mother stood before me, but nothing 
more than I phantom. 
—A phantom?—again I shudder. 
No, this is not true! Here, in this quiet room, my mother is not a phantom, but a part of my own criminal 
“self” to which I impart my will. Here in this remote corner, on the outskirts of the city, I am hiding one 
part of my soul from the guillotine.” 305 
 
 “Disappearing night and day into the Cheka,” which is incongruously based in the 
“mansion of an executed noble, with gorgeous door-curtains, ancient pictures, and 
portraits of the princely family,”306 the protagonist heads a revolutionary committee. This 
                                                 
304Ibid.38. 
“І тоді відходила, удалялась од мене моя мати — прообраз загірної М арії, і застигала, у тьмі 
чекаючи.” 
305 Ibid. 39. 
“І тоді, збентежений, запевняю себе, що це неправда, що ніякої матері нема переді мною, що це не 
більше, як фантом. — Фантом? — знову здригнув я.  Ні, саме це — неправда! Тут, у тихій кімнаті, 
моя мати не фантом, а частина мого власного злочинного «я», якому я даю волю. Тут, у глухому 
закутку, на краю города, я ховаю від гільйотини один кінець своєї душі.” 
306 Ibid. 34. 
“День і ніч я пропадаю в «чека». Помеш кання наше — фантастичний палац: це будинок 
розстріляного шяхтича. Химерні портьєри, древні візерунки, портрети княжої фамілії. Все це 
дивиться на мене з 
усіх кінців мойого випадкового кабінету.” 
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is “the new Sanhedrin, the dark tribunal of Communism,”307 where a committee of three 
pronounces death sentences on ideological criminals. Amid the anachronistic splendor of 
the mansion, images from the portraits on the walls, like spectres from a by-gone era, 
look down upon the protagonist from every corner of his “happenstance” office.308  But 
they do not provoke feelings of contempt in the protagonist; he is instead struck by their 
antiquity and grandeur. As he gazes at the paintings, the protagonist becomes aware that 
he stands on the precipice of the dawning of a new age, and he questions his role in it. 
His self-reflection leads to a realization of the essence of his dilemma: though the 
protagonist performs the morally reprehensible tasks required by Cheka, he yet retains a 
capacity for empathy, his humanity. His awareness of the impossibility of sustaining 
these two opposing ideas is the cause of his psychological crisis.  
“I look at the portraits: the prince is knitting his brows, the princess displaying a haughty disdain, while the 
princelings play in the gloom of century-old oaks. I, in this extraordinary austerity, feel the entire ancient 
world, all its impotent grandiosity, and the beauty of the former years of the nobility. It is like the precise 
placement of mother-of-pearl at the banquet table of a wild and starving land. And I am a complete 
stranger, a bandit by one terminology, an insurgent by another, I look frankly and sincerely at these 
portraits, and in my soul there is no anger and there never will be. And I realize this: I am a Chekist, but I 
am also a human being.309  
  
                                                 
307 Ibid. 35. 
“Це новий синедріон, це чорний трибунал комуни.” 
308 Ibid.34  
“День і ніч я пропадаю в «чека». Помеш кання наше — фантастичний палац: це будинок 
розстріляного шляхтича. Химерні портьєри, древні візерунки, портрети княжої фамілії. Все це 
дивиться на мене з усіх кінців мойого випадкового кабінету.” 
309Ibid. 34-35  
 “Я дивлюсь на портрети: князь хмурить брови, княгиня — надменна зневага, княжата — в темряві 
столітніх дубів. І в цій надзвичайній суворості я відчуваю весь древній світ, всю безсилу 
Грандіозність і красу третьої молодости минулих шляхетних літ. Це чіткий перлямутр на бенкеті 
дикої голодної країни.  
І я, зовсім чужа людина, бандит — за одною термінологією, інсургент — за другою , я просто і ясно 
дивлюсь на ці портрети і в моїй душі нема й не буде гніву. І це зрозуміло: — я — чекіст,але і 
людина. 
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 The protagonist’s fellow Chekists are the communard Andrusha, Dr. Tahabat, and 
the degenerate. Andrusha is the ideal communist; though he believes sincerely in the idea 
of Socialism, he is unwilling to sacrifice his moral principles in service to it. Like the 
Mother, Andrusha represents the compassionate and merciful aspects of the protagonist’s 
nature. As the protagonist knows, Andrusha believes that their activities “are indecent, 
that the communards are not used to such things, that this is—a bacchanal, etc., etc.”310  
When Andrusha voices his objections to the sadistic work of the tribunal, the protagonist, 
basking in his own fanaticism, berates Andrusha, who (recalling the imagery of the mint) 
“withers” before him.311  Andrusha functions as the protagonist’s conscience; he is 
ignored and ultimately banished suddenly from the story (“Andrusha has disappeared”)312 
before the protagonist commits his final irredeemable sin, matricide.   
 The Lenin-esque Dr. Tahabat represents the pragmatic, calculating, and 
doctrinaire aspects of the protagonist’s psyche. This Doctor, with his “wide brow and 
white in his baldness, with his cold reasoning, and with a stone instead of a heart,”313 is 
unencumbered by a sense of moral responsibility; he maintains a certain power over the 
                                                 
310 Ibid.37. 
“Але Андрюша нервово переходить із місця на місце і все поривається щось сказати. Я знаю , що 
він думає: він хоче сказати, що так нечесно, що так комунари не роблять, що це — бакханалія і т.д. , 
і т. п" 
311 In the first instance of what I translated here as “withering,” Khvylovy wrote “м’ята вмирає в тузі,” 
literally “the mint is dying in sorrow.” In the second instance, concerning Andrusha, Khvylovy wrote ” 
Андрюша знітився, зблід і вийшов із кабінету, (“Andrusha shriveled, grew pale and left the room.”) The 
basic images of withering away and dying are evident in both examples.  
312 Khvylovy, M. “Ia Romantika” Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.2 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 48. 
“Андрюша десь ізник” 
313 Ibid. 37  
“Цей доктор із широким лобом і білою лисиною, з холодним розумом і з каменем замість серця…” 
 106 
protagonist through his ability to “be cruel and inhuman when reason dictates.”314  The 
protagonist realizes that in the Doctor’s hands, he “is merely an insignificant thing which 
has surrendered to a predacious will.” 315 “Is he not both my inescapable master and my 
beastly instinct?” 316 Dr. Tahabat’s faithful lackey, the degenerate, unquestioningly 
carries out the Doctor’s commands. The degenerate is “the arm that carries out the orders 
of the cold, dispassionate brain.”317 “If the Doctor is the evil genius, my evil will,” 
reflects the protagonist, “then the degenerate is the executioner from the guillotine.318 
 Fearing a revolt, agents of the Cheka scour the city for enemies, “already there are 
not enough prisons for the guilty, and yet almost innocent city rabble.”319 The members 
of the “dark tribunal” are tasked with the adjudicating the fate the so-called enemies of 
the Revolution. However, the cases presided over here do not concern violent counter-
revolutionaries, but rather a theosophist husband and wife and a group of nuns; they’ve 
committed the capital offense of ideological non-conformity. The protagonist presides 
over the first case, number 282,320 that of a theosophist man and wife accused of holding 
                                                 
314 Ferguson, “Lyricism.” 430. 
315 Khvylovy, M. “Ia Romantika” Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.2 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 37 
316 Ibid. 37 
“-- це ж він і мій безвихідний хазяїн, мій звірячий інстинкт.” 
317 Ferguson, “Lyricism.” 430 
318 Khvylovy, M. “Ia Romantika” Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.2 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986.38. 
“коли доктор — злий геній, зла моя воля, тоді дегенерат є палач із гільйотини”. 
319 Ibid.40  
“Так! Так! Я знаю: може спалахнути бунт, і мої вірні агенти ширяють по заулках, і вже нікуди 
вміщати цей винний і майже невинний обивательський хлам.” 
320 In “Ya…Romantika,” codes, which are embedded in the text, share a symbolic link to Khvylovy’s own 
suicide. For Khvylovy, numbers are significant, particularly the number 13. As we are told, the case of the 
condemned couple is assigned case number 282, three numbers which add to twelve. We can conclude that 
the case number then for the group of nuns (although it is never stated) would be 283, adding to 13. The 
significance is evident when we take into consideration Khylovy’s fixation with the number thirteen and his 
May 13 suicide. Khvylovy even wrote in his suicide letter, “Remember how I loved the number thirteen?” 
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secretive night-time meetings in their apartment. The protagonist takes a sadistic pleasure 
in abusing the couple, pronouncing their death sentences as they plead before him. “Ah, 
you are theosophists!” the protagonist proclaims, 
You are seeking Truth! New Truth? Yes! Yes! Who is it? Christ? No? Another savior of the world? Yes! 
You are not content with Confucius, nor with Buddha, nor with Lao-Tse, nor with Mahomet, nor with the 
devil himself. Ah, I understand: you need to fill the void…Then why, in the devil’s name not make Cheka 
your new Messiah?321 
 
Pleased by his capacity for cruelty, the protagonist revels in a growing sense of 
ideological fervor, which he compares to the fanaticism of holy warriors.  
I am entering into my role. A mist stands before my eyes, and I was in a state that could be qualified as 
extreme ecstasy. I suppose that in such a state the fanatics went to Holy War.322  
A group of nuns, among them the protagonist’s mother, crowd into his office, charged 
with agitating against the Commune. The protagonist receives the group with his back 
turned, observing the darkening sky from his office windows. Resolutely he turns around, 
intending to pronounce a death sentence on the group, but the sight of his mother 
reignites his crisis of conscience.  
But I turn and see—right before me stands my mother, my sorrowful mother, with the eyes of Maria. In 
alarm, I flung myself sideways: what is this—a hallucination? In distress I darted to the other side and cried 
out: You? And from the crowd of women I hear a voice fraught with pain: ‘Son! My rebellious son!’ I feel 
as though I am on the point of collapse. I am dumbstruck; I grasp a chair and brace myself against it. But at 
that moment, a boisterous, rolling laughter strikes against the ceiling and vanishes. It is the Doctor Tahabat: 
                                                                                                                                                 
A second point of interest concerns the similarity in manner of death between Khvylovy and the Mother: 
both die of gunshot wounds to the temple. This kind of coding is interesting because, I think, it affords an 
extra-textual understanding of the author and the story. The observations made here are my own; however 
for an authoritative examination of symbolic autobiography in Khvylovy’s works, see George Grabowicz, 
“Symbolic Autobiography in the Prose of Mykola Khvylovy.”   
321 Ibid. 43. 
“Ага, ви теософи! Шукаєте правди!.. Нової? Так! Так!..Хто ж це? .. Христос?.. Ні?.. Інший спаситель 
світу?..Так! Вас не задовольняє ні Конфуцій, ні Лао-тсе, ні Будда,ні Магомет, ні сам чорт!.. Ага, 
розумію: треба заповнити порожнє місце... — Так якого ж ви чорта, мать вашу перетак, не зробите 
цього Месію з «чека»? 
322 Khvylovy, M. “Ia Romantika” Tvori v pyatokh tomakh Vol.2 Smoloskyp: Baltimore, 1986. 41  
“Я входив у ролю. Туман стояв перед очима, і я був у тім стані, який можна кваліфікувати, як 
надзвичайний екстаз. Я гадаю , що в такім стані фанатики йшли на священну війну.” 
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‘Mother?! Ah you, damned muppet. Still need mother’s breast? Mother?!!’ I instantly come to my senses 
and grip the Mauser. ‘Hell!’ and I threw myself upon the Doctor. But he just watched me coldly and said: 
“Well, well, calm down, you traitor to the Commune. See to it that you settle affairs with “mother” (he 
emphasized “with mother”) as with the others.323 
 
A mirror hangs above the heads of the condemned nuns, in which the protagonist 
sees himself: “pale, almost lifeless.”324  He is confronted with the realization that he must 
commit matricide if he is to prove his worth as a “soldier of the revolution.”  For the 
protagonist, there is an implicit understanding that the killing of his mother equates 
symbolically to a killing of himself. 325“Yes,” he thinks, “At last they have seized the 
other end of my soul. No longer will I go to the edge of the city in order to hide my 
criminal self. I now have only one law: never to say anything to anyone about how I split 
my ‘I.’”326 The protagonist instructs the sentinel to take the group to the cellar, which 
elicits another eruption of laughter from Doctor Tahabat. 
Outside, amid an increasing cannonade and rising smoke on the horizon, the 
enemy’s forces press down upon the insurgents: “A smell of execution hung in the 
                                                 
323 Ibid. 44. 
“але я повертаюсь і бачу — прямо переді мною стоїть моя мати, моя печальна мати, з очима Марії. 
Я в тривозі метнувся вбік: що це — галюцинація? Я в тривозі метнувся вбік і скрикнув: — Ти? І чую 
з натовпу женщин зажурне: — Сину! мій м ’ятежний сину! Я почуваю, що от-от упаду. Мені дурно, 
я схопився 
рукою за крісло й похилився. Але в той же момент регіт грохотом покотився, бухнувся об стелю й 
пропав. То доктор Тагабат: — «Мамо»?! Ах ти, чортова кукло! Сісі захотів? «Мамо»?!! Я вмить 
опам’ятався й схопився рукою за мавзер. — Чорт! — і кинувся на доктора. Але той холодно 
подивився на мене й сказав: 
— Ну, ну, тихше, зраднику комуни! Зумій розправитись і з «мамою» (він підкреслив «з мамою»), як 
умів розправлятися з іншими.” 
324 Ibid.45 “Блідий, майже мертвий…”.  
 
 
326 Ibid.45. “Так! — схопили нарешті й другий кінець моєї душі! Вже не піду я на край города 
злочинно ховати себе. І тепер я маю одно тільки право:— нікому, ніколи й нічого неговорити, як 
розкололось моє власне «я».” 
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air.”327 The insurgents risk being overrun by the enemy and the protagonist must quickly 
decide the fate of his mother. The chaos of his external reality mimics the protagonist’s 
internal strife and belies the fact that he has already decided his mother’s fate. “Yes,” he 
thinks to himself, “these were impossible moments. This was torture. But I already knew 
what I would do. I knew it when I left the palace. Otherwise, I would not have left so 
quickly.”328 The protagonist laughs wildly at Andrusha’s final appeal for the mother’s 
clemency. Then, “Andrusha is gone,” and along with him the possibility for any sort of 
spiritual redemption for the protagonist. But, back inside the palace, Doctor Tahabat 
remains, lounging sensuously on the couch, drinking the wine of the former residents, 
and throwing the empty bottles on the floor. Tahabat’s self-righteous behavior and the 
“ironic glances” he casts provoke feelings of inadequacy in the protagonist; ultimately he 
capitulates, “like a beaten dog,” surrendering his will before the Doctor.  
 “At that I stand and become enraged.—Doctor Tahabat, for the last time I warn you: do not joke with me. 
But my voice breaks and there is a gurgling in my throat. I make an attempt to grab up the Mauser and 
finish off the Doctor right there. But I suddenly feel and perceive myself to be so piteous and worthless that 
the remnants of my will are leaving me. I sit, mournfully, on the sofa like a beaten, impotent hound, gazing 
at Tahabat.329 
 
Forced to evacuate the palace, the tribunal leads the procession of the condemned 
out of the city in preparation for their executions. Bracketed by Tahabat and the 
                                                 
327 Ibid.46.  
“Пахло розстрілами.”  
328 Ibid. 46. “...Так, це були неможливі хвилини. Це була мука. —Але я вже знав, як я зроблю. Я знав 
і тоді, коли покинув маєток. Інакше я не вийш ов би так швидко з кабінету.” 
329 Ibid. 49 
“Тоді я не витримую й шаленію. — Докторе Тагабат! Останній раз попереджаю: не жартуйте зі 
мною! Але голос мій зривається, і мені булькає в горлі. Я пориваюся схопити мавзера й тут же 
прикінчити з доктором, але я раптом почуваю себе жалким, нікчемним і пізнаю, що від мене 
відходять рештки волі. Я сідаю на канапу й жалібно, як побитий безсилий пес, дивлюся на 
Тагабата.” 
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degenerate, “the sentinels of my soul,” the protagonist’s fate is ineluctable: he must 
commit matricide, and in doing so eternally sever any link between revolutionary 
obligation and moral imperative. Nevertheless, the anticipation of the final act is 
torturous for the protagonist. Though he cannot see his mother, he can sense her 
presence. The image of the mint in connection to the mother recurs here and takes on a 
multi-sensory significance.  “I look at the crowd, but I see nothing there. Instead I feel: 
There went my mother with her head bent. I can feel: the smell of mint. I caress her dear 
head, with its silvery-grey hair.”330  
The protagonist’s psychological rupture is manifest; again he is temporarily 
unable to discern fantasy from reality. His decision to kill his mother signifies that he can 
no longer take refuge from the savagery and nihilism of the external world behind the 
ideals which the mother symbolizes. Thus, he kills not only her, but also that part of 
himself which identified with righteousness. The protagonist’s hopeless and insuperable 
external reality reasserts itself with a palpably: “Which is it: reality or hallucination? But 
this was reality: an authentic and vital reality, rapacious and cruel, like a pack of starving 
wolves. This was a hopeless reality, as inevitable as death.”331 The protagonist reassures 
                                                 
330 Ibid. 50  
“Я дивився в натовп, але я там нічого не бачив. Зате я відчував: — там ішла моя мати з похиленою 
головою. Я відчував: пахне м’ятою . Я гладив її милу голову з нальотом сріблястої сивини. Але 
раптом переді мною виростала загірна даль. Тоді мені знову до болю хотілося впасти на коліна й м 
олитовно дивитися на волохату силюету чорного трибуналу комуни.” 
331 Ibid.51 
“Що це: дійсність чи галюцинація? Але це була дійсність: справжня життьова дійсність — хижа й 
жорстока, як зграя голодних вовків. Це була дійсність безвихідна, неминуча, як сама смерть.” 
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himself that “still it is the only way to the distant lakes of the unknown and beautiful 
commune.”332  
Reaching the outskirts of town, the protagonist stands alone with his mother. The 
sounds of the approaching battle hasten his decision to act. 
Then, in a daze, enveloped by the flames of an impossible joy, I put my arm around my mother’s neck and 
pressed her head to my breast. Then I raised my pistol and put the barrel to her temple.  
Like a cut spike of wheat she fell on me.333 
Ironically, the matricide, the act which was to signify to his compatriots the extent of 
protagonist’s ideological commitment, actually affords him no consideration. In reality, 
the protagonist, originally the head of the revolutionary tribunal has debased himself to 
the point that he is beneath even the degenerate. As the protagonist kneels over his dead 
mother, the degenerate appears and gives orders to his superior: “Well, communard, get 
up! It’s time to join the battalion.” The act of matricide results in a total loss of the 
protagonist’s agency, who is reduced to taking orders from a degenerate. 
 A close reading of Mykola Khvylovy’s “Ia… Romantika,” deepens our 
understanding of the nature of the protagonist’s internal dilemma. Unable to reconcile his 
revolutionary duties with his innate sense of moral rectitude, the protagonist splits his “I;” 
he then is forced to destroy that part of himself which is incompatible with his external 
reality: his humanity. An examination of the “characters” in “Ia…Romantika” reveals 
them to be facets of the protagonist’s psyche, through which his personal crisis is acted 
                                                 
332 Ibid. 51.  
“Воістину: це була дійсність, як зграя голодних вовків. Але це була й єдина дорога до загірних озер 
невідомої прекрасної комуни.” 
333 Ibid. 52. 
 “...Тоді я у млості, охоплений пожаром якоїсь неможливої радости, закинув руку нашию своєї 
матері й притиснув її голову до своїх грудей. Потім підвів мавзера й нажав спуск на скроню. Як 
зрізаний колос, похилилася вона на мене.” 
 112 
out. The interactions among these sides are characterized by a psychopathic discourse 
that alternates between fantasy and reality. As Yuri Bezkhoutry has noted, In 
“Ia…Romantika,” there exists a “symbiosis between illusion and reality…The boundaries 
between actuality and fantasy are precarious and uncertain.”334 The tension between the 
between the protagonist’s internal and external worlds reaches its apex with the killing of 
the mother. Ultimately, by killing his mother, the protagonist rejects moral responsibility 













                                                 
334 Khudozhnii svit Mikoli Khvylovoho: Avtoreferat disertatsii kafedra filologichnii nauk, Yuri M. 
Bezkhutrii . Lvivskii Natsionalnii Universitet imena Ivana Franka. Lviv: B.v., 2003. 76. 
 “Характерною властивістю цієї новели Хвильового є типовий для літератури ХХ століття симбіоз 
ілюзії та реальності. Читачеві буває надзвичайно важко розрізнити, чи описувані події й відчуття 
насправді відбуваються й переживаються, чи це лише уявлювані героєм, нафантазовані ним 
картини. Межа між дійсністю і фантазією виявляється хисткою й невизначеною. 
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In the first part of the twentieth century, a renaissance in Ukrainian political, 
cultural, and literary life occurred, which was driven by the creative well-spring that 
became known as the Ukrainian Revolution. The Ukrainian intelligentsia recognized that 
their revolution was inherently a struggle for national liberation. To this end, they sought 
autonomy in all aspects of Ukrainian life. Immediately after the Provisional government 
in Russia fell, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and other Ukrainian 
patriots established a central government, whose first order of business was to pronounce 
Ukrainian autonomy within Russia. Recognizing the historical affinities between the 
Ukrainian and Russian peoples and expressing a cautious optimism for their declarations 
of sovereignty, the new Ukrainian government asserted in its First Universal its basic 
right to “manage its own life on its own soil.” However, dreams of Ukrainian political 
sovereignty were deferred due to the interference of foreign occupiers on Ukrainian soil. 
Ultimately, the Red Army won out, the Ukrainian National Republic was abolished, and 
Moscow asserted its political hegemony over Ukraine.  
However, the Ukrainian idea did not die. In the absence of political independence, 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia worked to expand a discourse on Ukrainian culture and 
literature within the new framework of the Soviet Ukrainian government. The state policy 
of Ukrainianization afforded intelligentsia members the hope that Ukrainian language and 
culture could be disseminated throughout the cities and in the countryside. Their ideas on 
Ukrainianization, however, often opposed the official Party line, and this brought them 
into conflict with other Party members. Oleksandr Shumsky was an example of a 
Ukrainian politician who sought to work within the Soviet framework to promote 
Ukrainian interests. His efforts demonstrate the desire of a Ukrainian intelligentsia to be 
led by a government in Ukraine that was more representative of Ukrainians. His 
outspoken efforts concerning the pace of Ukrainianization earned him the indignation of 
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the Party, which condemned his activities as “Shumskyist.” The Party realized the 
ideological significance of making an example out of Oleksandr Shumsky. Shumskyism 
became synonymous with any perceived manifestation of Ukrainian bourgeois 
nationalism. And Shumsky’s defense of the Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy doomed 
both men. Moscow’s proscription of Ukrainian autonomy within the political sphere 
overlapped and paralleled its attempts to circumscribe Ukrainian literary and cultural 
expression. 
 Mykola Khvylovy is the unquestioned leader of what became known as the 
“executed renaissance” in Ukrainian literature. Like his contemporaries who were 
involved in the Ukrainian political movement, he was an ardent communist. However, his 
revolutionary and socialist idealism was at odds with the brutal reality that the revolution 
had produced. In his polemical pamphlets, Khvylovy decried the lowering of artistic 
standards and promoted his vision for a Ukrainian literature that was independent of 
Russia. Khvylovy defended literature against what he saw as manifestations of 
philistinism, which threatened the very existence of art. His outspoken nature and the 
implications of his ideology caused him to become a target of the Soviet regime. His 
polemical pamphlets and prose became the basis for which he was condemned by the 
state. Finally, Khvylovy’s suicide casts him in a martyrological light: he became a 
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